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222 Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity long-standing European leaders, and may lead to the collapse of the EU’s open border policy—the Schengen area—which would not only be a setback for EU policy but could contribute further to a downturn in the global economy. Addressing the crisis need not necessarily lead to thousands seeking refuge in the United States, although it may imply a more active U.S. role in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars to help alleviate the situations that have forced so many to flee in the first place. 2. corruption. Corruption and other failures of the rule of law are often the underlying cause of countries’ inability to make progress on their own human rights and humanitarian problems, as well as to develop thriving economies. Over time, reducing or eliminating corruption not only brings coherence and order to the societies being served but also helps create economic opportunity for the U.S. financial and commercial sectors that are not permitted to use bribery as a tool of commerce (as some competitors do) and who benefit most from a rules-based environment in doing business abroad. 3. support for civil society. As already mentioned, the world’s surviving autocrats have become more astute in devising ways to cling to power, not only by crushing opponents but also through a range of activities aimed at intimidating civil society, from surveillance and censorship to legal harassment and extrajudicial punishment. Delegitimizing nongovernmental organizations by branding them as agents of a foreign power is a common technique. 27 Nevertheless, the United States (as well as U.S. nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and private citizens) can continue to support civil society groups through diplomatic and assistance efforts, 28 people-to-people exchanges, and engagement among experts. Particularly when political reform seems unlikely if not impossible, the United States can play a critical role through the patient cultivation of ties with civil society groups. 27 Freedom House, 2016a. 28 USAID, Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, Stand with Civil Society: Best Practices, January 2014.
How to Choose 223 Limit Regret At a minimum, U.S. leaders have a moral requirement to protect their people from serious harm. It has been said the 9/11 attacks were the first large-scale external attacks on American soil since the British invaded and burned Washington during the War of 1812. 29 These have been followed by a growing number of high-casualty internal attacks by so-called “lone wolves,” including U.S. citizens inspired or justified by violent Islamist ideology, but so far without the use of nuclear, radiological, or biological weapons. There is little doubt that the responsibility to protect the American people weighs heavily on every U.S. president. In the early days of the republic, this meant defending U.S. borders and coastal waterways against invasion and incursion, protecting against natural disaster, and, in time, establishing a public health system to protect against pandemic and plague. These basic requirements remained in place until the dawn of the nuclear age. During the Cold War, protecting the American people from serious harm meant all of the above plus a daunting new requirement: precluding nuclear attack on the United States. This led to the development of theories of deterrence (discussed in Chapter Five) and enormous investments in the intellectual makeup and arsenal of deterrence. This was a monumental effort and proved to be a much riskier effort than any at the time understood or many choose to remember. For more than a decade following the end of the Cold War, the United States experienced a relative sense of invulnerability. U.S. interests were challenged abroad, to be sure, but Americans felt relatively safe at home. U.S. borders were secure from invasion and attack, and the risk of global pandemic had not yet crept into America’s consciousness. Nuclear weapons continued to exist, although attention was moving away from the threat of an all-out attack and more toward concerns about the possibility of “loose nukes,” either in the hands of a rogue state or possibly a terrorist. Although some worried about the dire consequences of a nuclear or biological attack, this was not at the forefront 29 Hawaii was a U.S. territory but not yet a state in 1941 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
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STRATEGIC RETHINK STRATEGIC CHOICES
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Preface This is the sixth and final
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Preface v The RAND Strategic Rethin
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viii Strategic Choices for a Turbul
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Contents Preface...................
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Contents xiii Middle East..........
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Summary For more than seven decades
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Summary xix deal with because of it
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Summary xxi Familiarity does not ne
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Summary xxiii Whatever else is on t
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Summary xxv of richest Americans, i
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Summary xxvii reexamination arises
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Summary xxix Dwight Eisenhower—wh
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Summary xxxi of ISIS, the migration
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Acknowledgments RAND Corporation Pr
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction What is Am
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Introduction 3 that some allies hav
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Introduction 5 of distrust of the g
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Introduction 7 live with. Therefore
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Introduction 9 Bruce Jones points o
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Introduction 11 force decision make
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Introduction 13 United States for l
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CHAPTER TWO From Triumph to Stalema
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From Triumph to Stalemate: The Loss
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CHAPTER THREE Is the World Falling
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Is the World Falling Apart (And How
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Figure 3.4 Map of Climate Change Ho
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CHAPTER FOUR Leveraging U.S. Streng
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Leveraging U.S. Strengths, Dealing
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Part Two Strategic Choices
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CHAPTER EIGHT Option II: “The Ind
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STRATEGIC

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