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154 Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity job losses from reducing international exchange. Effects could include higher consumer prices, lower overall compensation, and possibly a slowdown in growth of GDP and higher inflation. These would need to be understood as the price paid by the economy as a whole to produce higher wages for some workers. Russia Assumptions Russia will continue to try to regain its influence in the former Soviet territories, but it is highly unlikely to attack a NATO country—and if it did, the aggression could eventually be turned back by a combination of political, economic, and military pressures. Putin may or may not be deterred by Western economic sanctions, but he might be constrained by Russia’s economic woes, including a shrinking economy due to the collapse in oil prices, and an inflation rate of more than 15 percent. 8 Indirect aggression sponsored by Moscow in other countries may continue. This may include hybrid or “gray zone” tactics, political attempts to undermine European unity, or sabotage. 9 These stop short of being acts of war, which makes them particularly hard to counter, given the strong NATO interest in avoiding war with Russia. The United States and its allies might respond with similar hybrid tactics and/or attempt to counter them by political and diplomatic means. Under this concept, preventing Russian control or influence over Ukraine or other non-NATO countries is desirable but not essential 8 The World Bank estimated in September 2015 that Russia’s economy would shrink by 3.8 percent in 2015 and 0.6 percent in 2016. In November 2015, it pegged the inflation rate at 15.6 percent. World Bank, Russia Economic Report 34: Balancing Economic Adjustment and Transformation, September 30, 2015a; World Bank, Russian Federation Monthly Economic Developments, November 11, 2015c. 9 Sabotage and other “gray zone” aggression have been used by both sides; pro-Ukrainian forces are accused of sabotaging the electrical lines leading to Russian Crimea. Ivan Nechepurenko and Neil MacFarquhar, “As Sabotage Blacks Out Crimea, Tatars Prevent Repairs,” New York Times, November 23, 2015.
Option I: “Come Home America”: Domestic Renewal, International Restraint 155 to U.S. well-being. After all, the United States flourished for 45 years despite Soviet domination of its “near abroad.” Instead, the United States might work with the allies to establish Ukraine as a neutral buffer zone between NATO and Russia, one that participates in both European and Russian trading blocks. This approach is informed by the view of some Russia experts that the fall of Putin could result in the rise of an even more aggressive, nationalist government in Moscow. Russia could pose a short-term threat to Europe but finds itself in demographic and financial decline over the long term. It is having difficulty keeping its million-man military at full strength, and by some estimates, might be able to afford a defense budget of $100 billion to $150 billion in 2020—only about one-eighth of what the NATO members spent in 2015. 10 The Russian economy fell into recession in 2015, and even if the economy grows in line with official predictions of a recovery to 2.2 percent growth, this would be far below the average annual rates of the last decade. 11 Labor-force participation has plunged and there is substantial evidence that the Russian people are feeling the impact of Western sanctions, state budget-tightening, and higher food prices under the Putinimposed restrictions on the import of Western foodstuffs. Anti-American sentiment is running so high, and the media and civil society are now so repressed, that there is little reason to believe that democratic reforms or a pro-Western policy will prevail in Russia any time soon. The essential U.S. goals in this strategy are to protect NATO allies and wait Putin out while attempting to maintain ties with Russian civil society. In the long run, a Russia in decline will eventually have to relinquish its gains in the “near abroad” and perhaps in Syria. To succeed in this strategy, Washington would be required to draw a persuasive red line on attacks—conventional, hybrid, or covert—on NATO treaty allies, and may need to sustain international economic sanctions. 10 Clifford Gaddy and Michael O’Hanlon, “Toward a ‘Reaganov’ Russia: Russian Security Policy After Putin,” Washington Quarterly, July 2015. 11 Keith Crane et al., Russia’s Medium-Term Economic Prospects, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1468-RC, 2016, p. 54.
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STRATEGIC RETHINK STRATEGIC CHOICES
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Preface This is the sixth and final
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Preface v The RAND Strategic Rethin
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viii Strategic Choices for a Turbul
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Contents Preface...................
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Contents xiii Middle East..........
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Summary For more than seven decades
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Summary xix deal with because of it
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Summary xxi Familiarity does not ne
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Summary xxiii Whatever else is on t
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Summary xxv of richest Americans, i
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Summary xxvii reexamination arises
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Summary xxix Dwight Eisenhower—wh
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Summary xxxi of ISIS, the migration
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Acknowledgments RAND Corporation Pr
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction What is Am
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Introduction 3 that some allies hav
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Introduction 5 of distrust of the g
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Introduction 7 live with. Therefore
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Introduction 9 Bruce Jones points o
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Introduction 11 force decision make
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Introduction 13 United States for l
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CHAPTER TWO From Triumph to Stalema
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From Triumph to Stalemate: The Loss
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CHAPTER THREE Is the World Falling
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Is the World Falling Apart (And How
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Figure 3.4 Map of Climate Change Ho
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CHAPTER FOUR Leveraging U.S. Streng
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Leveraging U.S. Strengths, Dealing
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CODA The Challenge of Leadership: A
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The Challenge of Leadership: Aligni
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