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212 Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity a “keep out” zone in East Asia. Several of our RAND colleagues have noted that China does not have a monopoly on these capabilities and that, with U.S. assistance, important East Asian allies could create “keep out” zones of their own. 13 Even those who espouse a less active role for the United States might welcome an alternative that would enable partners to do more to provide for their own security. The United States also could take advantage of Russia’s recent provocations to forge a new NATO security agenda that can deal with the rising threat from Moscow. Close Russia watchers are divided on whether Russia has the economic wherewithal to sustain these challenges indefinitely. 14 There is little doubt, however, that NATO has an exposed eastern flank that demands immediate attention. NATO has the opportunity not only to secure its northeastern flank but also to introduce a common Euro-American agenda, which has been largely missing since the second round of NATO enlargement. For nearly two decades, NATO has been focused on security challenges outside of Europe; it is now time to recalibrate to address new challenges emanating from afar, as evidenced in the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the ongoing migration crisis, and a resurgent threat from Russia. In addition, the United States could develop contingency plans in the event that Iran makes the gross strategic blunder of violating the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the EU. The existence of such back-up plans—and, more importantly, of the political will to enforce them—may be useful in maintaining Tehran’s continuing compliance. Whatever choices they make, U.S. leaders need to be attentive to such opportunities as they arise and show ingenuity, flexibility, and the ability to offer a constructive, positive alternative to authoritarianism, 13 For an illustration, see Terrence Kelly et al., The U.S. Army in Asia, 2030–2040, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-474-A, 2014. 14 For an analysis of economic factors constraining Russia, including the depreciation of the ruble, state control of the economy, corruption, and the increased cost of capital due to sanctions, see Crane et al., 2016. For an overview of polling data and other political constraints on the Russian government, see “Putin’s Core Support Begins to Waver,” Bloomberg, June 9, 2016.
How to Choose 213 aggression, and even chaos. The United States still has a strong hand to play. Uphold Commitments The United States remains the partner of choice because it has made good on its commitments to other nations. This has been true since the early days of the Cold War when fledgling democracies in Europe came under assault. The United States has earned a reputation around the globe as a generous, reliable partner, from its steadfast support for its NATO partners to its long-standing commitment to Japan and South Korea; its protection of Kuwait in the face of Iraqi aggression; and its consistent record of helping nations struck by famines, tsunamis, earthquakes, and other disasters. This is not to suggest that U.S. policy is never self-interested or that its attempts to help others cannot go awry—as was the case in Vietnam and Iraq. It is to suggest that the United States is a valued partner around the globe, and that its partners look to Washington to make good on its commitments. Some argue that the United States has carried too heavy a load and has encouraged “free riding” among many of its closest allies. The United States outspends its partners—to say nothing of its adversaries— by extraordinary sums and indeed maintains a substantial burden. There is little question that many allies can and should do more to provide for their own security. There is also significant risk that if the United States were to do less, or renege on its commitments, the result would be a more dangerous and unpredictable world. East Asia offers a relevant illustration. Some have argued that Japan and South Korea should bear more of the burden for their own security. 15 The argument has merit insofar as both nations have accumulated considerable wealth and are certainly capable of providing more for their own defense. But absent a robust 15 This evergreen argument was made in 1989 by James Fallows and again as recently as April 2016 by U.S. senators in a meeting with the NATO Secretary General. James Fallows, “Japan: Let Them Defend Themselves,” The Atlantic, April 1989; John Hudson, “Senators Slam NATO ‘Free-Riders’ in Closed-Door Meeting with Secretary General,” Foreign Policy, April 6, 2016.
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STRATEGIC RETHINK STRATEGIC CHOICES
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Preface This is the sixth and final
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Preface v The RAND Strategic Rethin
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viii Strategic Choices for a Turbul
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Contents Preface...................
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Contents xiii Middle East..........
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Summary For more than seven decades
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Summary xix deal with because of it
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Summary xxi Familiarity does not ne
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Summary xxiii Whatever else is on t
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Summary xxv of richest Americans, i
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Summary xxvii reexamination arises
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Summary xxix Dwight Eisenhower—wh
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Summary xxxi of ISIS, the migration
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Acknowledgments RAND Corporation Pr
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction What is Am
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Introduction 3 that some allies hav
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Introduction 5 of distrust of the g
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Introduction 7 live with. Therefore
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Introduction 9 Bruce Jones points o
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Introduction 11 force decision make
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Introduction 13 United States for l
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CHAPTER TWO From Triumph to Stalema
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From Triumph to Stalemate: The Loss
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CHAPTER THREE Is the World Falling
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Is the World Falling Apart (And How
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Figure 3.4 Map of Climate Change Ho
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CHAPTER FOUR Leveraging U.S. Streng
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Leveraging U.S. Strengths, Dealing
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Part Two Strategic Choices
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