STRATEGIC

Anticipation, Deterrence, and Resilience 125
certainly be based on the belief that they could achieve their principal
objectives before the United States or its allies could meaningfully react
to the situation. Presented with such a fait accompli, they might calculate
that the United States and its allies would realize the enormity
of the costs in lives and treasure that would be entailed in reversing
the situation, including the distinct possibility that Russia or China
might use nuclear weapons in a limited capacity, and conclude that the
interests at stake are not so vital as to be worth the costs. In brief, the
calculation that an adversary would be acting upon is that its stakes
(or interests) in the conflict sufficiently outweigh those of the United
States and its allies, and that sooner, rather than later, the United States
will conclude that the game is not worth the candle. 48
Deterrence is most likely to succeed when an aggressor believes it
cannot achieve its objectives short of a prolonged conflict of uncertain
outcome. As RAND colleague David Ochmanek has written, “The gold
standard of deterrence . . . is to confront a potential aggressor with the
credible prospect of failure.” 49
Were the United States to find itself in a situation in which Moscow
or Beijing attacked a NATO or other U.S. treaty ally, and Washington
did not respond with a viable conventional response or a credible
threat of nuclear retaliation, its alliance commitments would be rendered
meaningless. If Russia were to succeed in seizing the Baltics, for
example, South Korea and Japan would have every incentive to develop
more-independent security postures, possibly including nuclear weapons
of their own. If China succeeded in grabbing Taiwan, then the newer
members of NATO (every state that has acceded since the end of the
48 That an adversary might use nuclear weapons with such an intent is not mere speculation,
but has been the subject of Russian strategic military discussion in recent years. Recognizing
the increasing standing such concepts are receiving from potential adversaries,
the Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review emphatically states, “Our
nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the United States,
and through extended deterrence, it also serves to reassure our distant allies of their security
against regional aggression. It also supports our ability to project power by communicating
to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional
aggression.” Charles T. Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014, p. 12.
49 Ochmanek et al., 2015.