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216 Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World: In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity free. Russia was judged as no longer posing a serious threat to NATO, and Europe was judged to be stable and secure. A frequent expression over the years among close NATO observers was “out of area or out of business,” indicating a belief that NATO needed a common security agenda that allowed it to act beyond Europe’s boundaries to deal with larger global challenges. NATO’s long-term commitment in Afghanistan was seen as a promising sign. 19 Rising trouble could be seen in Russia’s 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and its 2008 invasion of Georgia. But not until Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its war against Ukraine did the true cost of NATO enlargement become clear. The question here is not about the wisdom of expanding the alliance. The lesson is about being clear-headed regarding the implications of new commitments as they are being considered. The first round of NATO enlargement, which brought Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the alliance, occurred after a vigorous national debate. The second round of enlargement, which brought Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia into the alliance, occurred with little to no debate. Any such future commitments, in Europe or elsewhere, need to be thoroughly evaluated because once the United States makes commitments to partners, it needs to be prepared to back them up—with force, if necessary. Play Both the Long and Short Games U.S. leaders have been most successful when they have been able to distinguish the challenge of the moment from the fundamental policies and structures needed to produce a more secure and prosperous future. Even while fighting World War II, Roosevelt and his advisers were contemplating and building the institutions and policies to cope with the world to come. Although their visions had to be adapted as 19 For a discussion of the political circumstances surrounding NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, see Andrew R. Hoehn and Sarah Harting, Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-974-AF, 2010.
How to Choose 217 the Cold War took shape, they conceived of many of the basic institutions and frameworks that survive to this day. Nixon’s opening to China was aimed at changing both the long and short games, seeking long-term leverage over the Soviet Union even while trying to end the war in Vietnam. Reagan played the short game in negotiating arms control agreements with Soviet leader Gorbachev while also trying to bring about a Soviet collapse. Both strategies worked. Clinton sought to enlarge the democratic peace by inviting those once captured in the East-West divide into the institutions of the West. Clinton’s moves were broadly popular at the time but almost certainly sowed the seeds of some of the challenges the United States confronts today. George W. Bush sought to transform the Middle East by displacing Saddam Hussein in Iraq and ushering in new democratic forms of governance. What followed was more than a decade of war and a hardening of Iraqi and Middle East politics. The long-term consequences will not be known for years. Obama sought to end the wars in the Middle East and pivot to Asia, another long-game strategem, but the move lost momentum because the short game in the Middle East was far from over and new strategic challenges arose in Europe. Indeed, ending the U.S. troop commitment in Iraq while the political and security situation there remained so fragile contributed, in part, to the rise of ISIS—a shortgame decision with long-game consequences. Finally, every President since Clinton has had to contend with the basic breakdown in global governance. From Mogadishu to Mosul, Aleppo to Benghazi, the breakdown in governance has proven to be a profound challenge to global security. Al Qaeda was able to plot its attacks against the United States amid the chaos that was the Taliban’s Afghanistan. While most Americans eschew the notion of being the world’s policeman, there needs to be a wider public recognition that the world’s ungoverned and misgoverned places can provide refuge to the most dangerous terrorist actors. The U.S. government well understands that governance is an essential element of stability; for example,
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STRATEGIC RETHINK STRATEGIC CHOICES
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Preface This is the sixth and final
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Preface v The RAND Strategic Rethin
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viii Strategic Choices for a Turbul
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Contents Preface...................
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Contents xiii Middle East..........
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Summary For more than seven decades
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Summary xix deal with because of it
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Summary xxi Familiarity does not ne
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Summary xxiii Whatever else is on t
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Summary xxv of richest Americans, i
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Summary xxvii reexamination arises
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Summary xxix Dwight Eisenhower—wh
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Summary xxxi of ISIS, the migration
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Acknowledgments RAND Corporation Pr
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction What is Am
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Introduction 3 that some allies hav
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Introduction 5 of distrust of the g
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Introduction 7 live with. Therefore
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Introduction 9 Bruce Jones points o
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Introduction 11 force decision make
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Introduction 13 United States for l
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CHAPTER TWO From Triumph to Stalema
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From Triumph to Stalemate: The Loss
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CHAPTER THREE Is the World Falling
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Is the World Falling Apart (And How
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Figure 3.4 Map of Climate Change Ho
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CHAPTER FOUR Leveraging U.S. Streng
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Leveraging U.S. Strengths, Dealing
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Part Two Strategic Choices
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