The 1995/1996 Household Income, Expenditure - (PDF, 101 mb ...

VI. 20
1995/1996 Urban Govs Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontier
Renters 8495.02 6542.57 6984.08 7102.28
Owners 9199.90 6380.81 5642.71 10146.46
If 29 the total expenditures above are deflated by household size and
makeup:
Equivalence-Adjusted Average Household Expenditures by Tenure and Area
1990/1991 Urban Govs Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontier
Ordinary 5050.31 4890.64 4884.30 4849.13
Rent
Furnished 4599.18 4405.40 4265.64 4113.72
Rent
Owners 5232.74 4950.93 4817.55 5114.86
Subsidized 5680.84 5296.32 5392.07 5397.78
Rent
1995/1996 Urban Govs Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Frontier
Renters 7150.27 6519.09 6613.75 6498.80
Owners 7238.10 6121.55 5624.66 6728.70
There are two rank reversals in the data after weighting for adult
equivalence, between ordinary renters and owners in Upper and Lower Egypt;
correction for household size results in ordinary renters now making higher
mean annual expenditures than owners in those areas. However, the furnished
rent payers are still at the bottom of the expenditure ladder, and the
subsidized rent class are still the highest spenders.
VLE Comparison of Utilities Shares for Both HIECSs
What basis is there for the subsidization of utilities and will price
increases on utilities harm the poor disproportionately? At first glance
utilities would seem proper targets for subsidization, as Chapter II presented
evidence that the composite good "housing and utilities" is inferior. From the
theory of optimal taxes, a Pareto improving price increase relies on an
inelastic marketed surplus, and therefore the precondition for efficiency of
targeting is whether the targeted good is inelastic. The optimal price given a
negative elasticity is another matter, of course.
29 The equivalence scale presented in Cardiff (1994) uses the simple fullsample,
level-level regression of food and beverages expenditures on total
expenditures, then weights the data by coefficient values on the number and
gender of adults and children.