The 1995/1996 Household Income, Expenditure - (PDF, 101 mb ...

IX.4
placed on HIECS survey output, for example, the more it will be in demand,
and the greater the pressure will be on CAPMAS to produce timely and
accurate results. Just the opposite has been the case in the past: lack of
pressure from policymakers is, perhaps, the main reason the 1987 Household
Labor Force Survey was never tabulated; the 1990/1991 HIECS results, also,
would not have been woefully delayed had external users, ministries, and
policymakers grasped the true value of survey results early on.
Competitive spirit should infuse any survey operation; not only should
the demand for survey output be expected to rise over time and experience,
but data supply should better respond to this demand. A free-market
approach to data collection is needed in Egypt, one which involves a number
of different "suppliers." CAPMAS's credibility and reputation as an objective,
reliable statistical organization would be enhanced through a policy of
openness, higher quality in-house analysis and timely processing, easier end-
. user access, and independent involvement by outsiders. Such openness would
have beneficial spillovers throughout the entire survey structure. Staff could
no longer afford to be complacent; data users would begin trusting CAPMAS
when it supports the measurement and control of survey errors, and is willing
to tell users about the quality of its products.
The laws as stated limit the access of raw data (or "crude" data) to all
except those working in CAPMAS. Potential users have had to approach
CAPMAS with specific but uncomplicated tabulation requests, and ultimately the
requestor would wait a lengthy period while the request was "processed;"
rarely has demand for data been properly filled to the satisfaction of the
potential user. Quite the opposite: total effective demand for CAPMAS data has
been improperly constrained by barriers to access. The market is thin by
design, and whether or not such a regulatory effect was intended, the policy
is wrong. For 32 years CAPMAS has had a monopoly in producing results that
few researchers or (even) other government agencies could legally refute or
corroborate. Of course, rent seeking behavior in obtaining data has produced
some notable exceptions.
CAPMAS management is the main impediment to data dissemination and
metadata evaluation. Management acts as the primary interest group, and sees
requests for data not as opportunities to inform public debate but as
currency for maintaining position. The practice of accessing data from
CAPMAS has usually come down to who knows whom, and which contacts can
be exploited to the least-cost effect. This author argues, on the other hand,
that data is a scarce public good, which might be allocated as in other
countries, on a willingness-to-pay basis. As positive externalities accrue to
the organization from goodwill, from a trusted commitment to openness, so
rises the value and quality of the data. Experimentation in a spirit of
competition produces the best data.
Concern for confidentiality is overly strident within the organization.
Researchers could never identify a specific household or firm from information
on the data file once· a certain amount of identifying information was removed.
There is a point to be made that certain data is proprietary and that a proper
balance must be struck between providing the data quickly while assuring
security. Also, the case of establishment data is special and requires a
different way of dealing with the problem, but the concept of liberalizing the
policy remains valid. Information on money-making operations might be
considered controversial, but here again, CAPMAS needs to examine just what
cause is served by refusing to provide the information.
It has been stated that households or firms which acted as respondents