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194 Chapter 4<br />
dispensation is justified in view of the serious circumstances he<br />
has outlined. His reasoning is of the sort that modern secular<br />
divorce court judges might use. On the one hand, to dissolve a<br />
marriage is a grave thing, not to be done without powerful reasons;<br />
but on the other hand, the reasons are weighty, for the marriage has<br />
irretrievably broken down, and is the source of great animosity. For<br />
a consummated marriage such reasoning would be inconceivable in<br />
this tradition.<br />
The reasons are set out why consequences can be weighed with<br />
unconsummated marriages while pure principle rules the law on<br />
consummated marriages. God gave a dispensing power to his vicar<br />
in matters which are inferred remotely rather than proximately<br />
from the principles of natural law and which contain an element of<br />
human rather than divine regulation; at least where ratified (nonconsummated)<br />
marriages are concerned, the power is a way of<br />
putting an end to scandals and strengthening peace in the state;<br />
after all, the signification of marriage is incomplete before consummation;<br />
before that it merely stands for the union of God and<br />
the soul through charity, but afterwards, Christ’s union with the<br />
Church; the Lord’s saying (Matt. 19: 6) that ‘What God has joined<br />
together, let no one put asunder’ comes after the words ‘and they<br />
will be two in one flesh’; again, St Paul’s reference in Ephesians 5 to<br />
‘the great sacrament’ comes after the words ‘they will be two in one<br />
flesh’; then Pignatelli quotes the passage of Leo the Great which<br />
was analysed in the first half of this chapter, naturally in the form<br />
which made the commingling of the sexes a sort of sine qua non of<br />
marriage’s proper representation of Christ and the Church. It is<br />
Ibid., passim, esp. pp. 185–6.<br />
I am paraphrasing the following passage: ‘Quod attinet ad potestatem Pontificis<br />
dispensandi non est dubitandum ex communi Canonistarum sententia, qui omnes,<br />
uno vel altero discrepante, docent, posse Summum Pontificem potestate quidem<br />
ordinaria matrimonium ratum ex causa dirimere. Quia Pontifex potest divina authoritate<br />
dispensare in aliquibus, quae non deducuntur proxime ex principiis juris<br />
naturae, sed remote, et quae habent admixtum aliquid obligationis humanae. Credibileque<br />
omnino est, Deum suo Vicario hanc potestatem contulisse, quae regimini<br />
Ecclesiae necessaria erat. Nam hac ratione, saltem in matrimoniiis ratis, multa scandala<br />
cessant, pax in Republica stabilitur, sine qua matrimonium est pactio servitutis.<br />
Quandoquidem matrimonii Sacramentum, quoad significationem non est completum<br />
usque ad carnalem copulam inclusive; ita quod matrimonium contractum sive<br />
ratum significet conjunctionem Dei ad animam per charitatem, consummatum vero<br />
conjunctionem Christi ad Ecclesiam. Prima autem conjunctio est solubilis, non secunda;<br />
ideoque matrimonium ratum solvi potest, non vero consummatum. Unde<br />
Dominus, Matth. 19. non dixit: Quos Deus [p. 185] conjunxit homo non separet, nisi