The Supreme Doctrine - neo-alchemist

ON THE IDEA OF ‘DISCIPLINE’
that, from the only real point of view of intemporal realisation, all the inner
mechanisms are of equal value; he is detached from the aesthetic or inaesthetic
character of his tendencies. This relative impartiality confers on him
a relative liberty. The withdrawal of partiality in face of the tendencies does
not prevent these from existing but it takes from them all compulsive value,
Dream and reality are more and more divided; I feel in accordance with my
dream, but I behave in accordance with my reason.
This method, then, which consists in consciously approving each
present tendency, confers on me a relative outer liberty. But it is not the
'letting go' of Zen. Consciously to authorise is not to let-go, it is only an
imitation of it. The letting-go, as we have seen, is realised when I authorise
the totality of my tendencies before the conscious appearance of any one of
them; and then none of them appears. When, on the contrary, I authorise my
present tendency, I only let-go with regard to this tendency; all the rest
remain held. Observation of my inner phenomena that is impartial and
approbatory cannot have by itself any efficacity for an eventual satori.
Let us return now to the letting-go as we have understood it. The
question is no longer for us to define the gesture of the correct inner task, but
to know when to make this gesture. It is thus at least that the question is at
first presented to us, in a form which would only be suitable if an ordinary
gesture were in question, a gesture of contraction. If I have decided to do
some physical culture I can ask myself 'when shall I do it?' because if some
moment of the day is more propitious than another for a good result from the
exercises, I can impose them on my muscles at that moment. It is not the
same for the inner gesture which decontracts all the tendencies by authorising
them all in a moment of impartiality. This gesture can be tried no matter
when, but not effected at random. My consciousness can demand this gesture
from my machine, but cannot impose it. The realisation of the gesture
supposes that two factors are united—that my thought proposes the gesture
and that my machine accepts it. If, meeting in me a resistance to the gesture
of decontraction I try to overcome this resistance, I prevent myself by that
very fact from succeeding, for then I graft a contraction onto a spasm.
Let us examine the two factors that we have just mentioned. It is
necessary that my thought propose the gesture. This assumes the vigilance of
the mind operating in an active manner; and this vigilance assumes a clear
understanding of the inner task and of its interest. In this vigilant invitation
by the active mind resides the veritable will, will which, as Spinoza said, is
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