The Supreme Doctrine - neo-alchemist
The Supreme Doctrine - neo-alchemist
The Supreme Doctrine - neo-alchemist
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Chapter Four<br />
THE EXISTENTIALISM OF ZEN<br />
A<br />
MAN declares: 'My life is insipid and monotonous; I do not call that<br />
living; at most it is existing.' Everyone understands what this man<br />
means to say, which proves that everyone carries in himself the idea<br />
of this distinction. At the same time, everyone feels that 'living' is superior to<br />
'existing'; and this opinion is so clear, so categoric, in the mind of man, that<br />
he comes to regard to 'exist' as nothing, and to 'live' as everything. <strong>The</strong><br />
distinction between the two terms is such that often it demolishes itself; one<br />
ends by saying 'existence' for 'life' and vice versa. 'Life' appears so uniquely<br />
important to man that it annexes the word 'existence' stripped of all its own<br />
meaning.<br />
Among the complex mass of phenomena which make up a humanbeing,<br />
which are those that proceed from living and which from existing? We<br />
find there the distinction between the animal kingdom and the vegetable<br />
kingdom. Animal and vegetable are not two creatures entirely different; the<br />
animal has everything that the vegetable has (vegetative life) and something<br />
more (life of communication). Inside the vegetable and the animal, within the<br />
limit constituted by their form, phenomena occur, intimate movements<br />
(circulation of sap or of blood, breathing, birth and death of cells, anabolism<br />
and catabolism). But, whereas the vegetable is fixed to the soil and has no<br />
movement of its whole self in relation to the soil, the animal is mobile in<br />
relation to the soil and can make all sorts of movements that one describes by<br />
the word 'action'.<br />
However, when man places living so much above existing the frontier<br />
of this preferential distinction does not lie between their vegetative<br />
phenomena and their actions; it lies within the domain of action, and in the<br />
following manner: among my actions some have for object the service of my<br />
vegetative life (to eat, to repose, to perform the sexual act by pure animal<br />
desire); these actions affirm me (that is to say maintain my creation) in so far<br />
as I am an organism in all respects similar to all the other animals, in so far as<br />
I live from the point of view of the universe, as a cosmic cog-wheel, in so far<br />
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