Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 87
which they would have been scientists) as seek identification, for
external reasons, with another field of study. In proceeding thus,
they were not trying to state the nature of their subject; they
were trying to get a value imputed to it. That this was, their
original rhetorical maneuver can be shown in the following way.
Rhetoric can be visualized as altogether a process of making
this kind of identification. The process is simply that of merging
something we would like to see taken as true with something that
is believed to be true, of merging something we would like to
get accepted with something that is accepted. Such an operation
can be seen in the most rudimentary of all rhetorical devices,
which is sometimes termed "name-calling." To something that
we wish to see accepted, we apply a name carrying prestige; to
something that we wish to s,ee rejected, we apply a name that
is distasteful. Rhetoric thus works through eulogistic and dyslogistic
vocabularies. It is the thing-to-be-identified-with that provides
the impulse, whether favorable or unfavorable. The honest
and discriminating rhetorician chooses these things with regard
to reason and a defensible scheme of values; the dishonest or unthinking
one may seize upon any terms which seem to possess
impulse, just to make use of their tractive power.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the scientistic sociologists
applied a prestige-earrying name to their study. They were not
classifying in the true sense; they were instigating an attitude.
In brief, "social science" is itself a rhetorical expression, not an
analytical one. The controversy over their methods and recommendations
which goes on today continues to reflect that fact.
3. Positive and Dialectical Terms
Having thus assumed the role of scientists, they were under
a necessity of maintaining that role. And this called for further
"identifications." Perhaps the most mischievous of these has been
the collapsing of the distinction between positive and dialectical
terms. Since this distinction is of the first importance to those
who would deal with these matters critically, I shall try to make
clear what is meant by it.
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