Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Science <strong>and</strong> the Studies of Man<br />
IV<br />
Let me begin with two prefatory remarks. The first is that<br />
naturalism is not a school of thought in the sense that idealism<br />
or phenomenology is. It is a conviction about the universe that<br />
is elaborated in diverse "vays. "Orthodox" naturalism, so to speak,<br />
adds to the proposition that nothing happens except by natural<br />
means another proposition, namely, that the only way to know<br />
what happens is to bring it within the purvie"v of science. This<br />
second proposition has been elaborated with gre.at care by positivists<br />
<strong>and</strong> instrumentalists who are committed to belief in "the<br />
unity of science." There are, however, naturalists who do not<br />
accept the doctrine of the unity of science.<br />
The second prefatory remark is this: It is widely held today<br />
that naturalis,m is one of the indispensable foundations of science.<br />
I heard an academic psychologist recently assert, with a warmth<br />
one does not expect of a scientist, that psychology is, possible<br />
only on a naturalistic foundation. However widespread this belief<br />
may be, it is false. Scientific activity of the most rigorous kind is<br />
consistent with an indeterminate number of philosophical convictions.<br />
The business of the scientist is to discover the invariant<br />
relations operative in the domain of his competence. What is to<br />
be found beyond the purview of scientific inquiry he need not<br />
make any assumptions about. He does not even need to believe,<br />
as has been alleged, that nature is through <strong>and</strong> through governed<br />
by the order that is expressed in scientific laws. When he espouses<br />
naturalism, his views do not have the authority that his scientific<br />
hypotheses have. When scientists speak of mathematics or geometry<br />
as the alphabet of nature, as the men of the seventeenth<br />
century did, they speak as philosophers; they do not speak as<br />
scientists. A scientist can say, with'Kant, that nature is the realm<br />
of law. But if he does, he must stop there, <strong>and</strong> he does not even<br />
have the right, qua scientist, to say that what we ordinarily call<br />
nature, the spatiotemporal world, is completely governed by law.<br />
Of course, in his inquiries he discovers laws-these are what he<br />
73