Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

18 Scientism and Values
VIII
I said a moment ago that in and through its institutions a
society is structuralized. I now want to enlarge on that statement.
Since each institution is the embodiment of a complexus of
valuations centering around some basic value, the structuralization
of any given society as a whole is ultimately a matter of the
distribution of value emphases-that is, it is a question of what is
the dominant valuation and what are its stratifications. And here
the social scientist faces the problem of discerning in the society
which he studies, not his own valuations, but the valuations and
value commitments indigenous to that society itself. The problem
has no e.asy solution; but unless it is solved, not only "in principle"
for societies in general, but for every particular society under investigation,
the investigator's work remains incomplete with
respect to that society. It is evident, however, that, even so, a
"value schematism," valid for any society, may also be of significance-in
the sense, namely, that it provides a "model" by
comparison with which (as an ideal case) actual societies or institutions
within a society may be better understood, even if only
in their deviations from the "model." And any investigation designed
to disclose the valuations and value commitments within
a given society is therefore a contribution to sociological knowledge.
It is at this point, incidentally, that interest in value as an
explanatory category in the social sciences is intimately interwoven
with value as factual subject matter for the social sciences.
It is clear, however, that reference to value in the latter sense
is but auxiliary to value as an explanatory category.
It is true, of course, that many of our basic valuations are
subconscious commitments which we make because they are part
and parcel of the society into which we were born and in which
we attained maturity. Nevertheless, as in our individual lives, so
in our social existence, there comes a time-at least for some
of us-when we demand a rational justification for our value
commitments and our distribution of value emphases. And it is
at such times-at times, that is, when we come to a clearer un-