Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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240 <strong>Scientism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Values</strong><br />
dore M. Newcomh has sympathetically reviewed what this is likely<br />
to imply, for example, for psychology:<br />
There is no harder lesson for the psychologist to learn, probably, than<br />
that of viewing persons as functionaries in a group structure rather<br />
than as psychological organisms-i.e., as parts rather than as wholes,<br />
<strong>and</strong> as parts which, within limits, are interchangeable.<br />
Once this lesson is learned, however, the facts of social structure<br />
become available; a social system is seen as made up of differentiated<br />
parts, the orderly relationships among which, rather than the personal<br />
identity of which, become the major object of concern. 6<br />
Far more broadly, Hannah Arendt, noting the implications of<br />
functionalizing the purposive, dramatic content of intellectual categories,<br />
has shown how it has become possible, for example, to<br />
identify Hitler <strong>and</strong> Jesus because functionally their roles were<br />
indistinguishable. 7 Such linking of variables becomes essential to<br />
a science intent on dealing with all components of a social field as<br />
role-playing functionaries so as to make society explicable. Full<br />
explication requires treating society as a system whose parts, in<br />
theory if not in momentarily stubborn fact, "make sense," all being<br />
duly related, complementing <strong>and</strong> balancing one another.<br />
On the basis of this assumption of the natural harmony of structural<br />
components" the quest for knowledge may proceed. By the<br />
traditional method of (1) postulating a hypothesis which might<br />
economically relate variables, (2) following through by making deductions,<br />
(3) checking whether the hypothesis corresponds to sense<br />
experience, <strong>and</strong> (4) accepting, amending, or rejecting the hypothesis-by<br />
this method reality may be known. 8 Hypotheses, assuredly,<br />
may have to be reversed by "factual reality." Yet, it should be<br />
noted, only ,after agreement is reached as to what is meant by<br />
"facts" do facts actually have the final say: facts, it is held, must be<br />
so constituted as to leave manifest traces before they can be given a<br />
voice. The social scientist's hypotheses----devised to lead him to uniformities<br />
of behavior-will permit rational, scientific control only<br />
of such facts as take their place in his conceptual order of uniformly<br />
related, coexisting parts. His very approach is designed to