Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Science and the Studies of Man 75
ported by compelling empirical evidence," rather than being
"dicta based on dogmatic preference."25
We must examine with care the problems generated by these
avowals and disavowals.
But before turning to the substance of our philosopher's argument,
I invite the reader to consider its £onn. I think we owe
our philosopher thanks for the linguistic lesson that he has taught
us in passing. The phr.ases "compelling empirical evidence" and
"dicta based on dogmatic preference" are descriptive, neutral,
utterly value-free, and therefore appropriate for scientific discourse.
However, isn't there something slightly unscientific in the
manner in which our philosopher dismisses the beliefs of those
with whom he disagrees? His opponents accept their beliefs on
the ground of preference. Our philosopher knows their motivations.
And, of course, his own conviction has been gained the hard
way, by gathering empirical evidence irrespective of his own
preferences. Indeed, he has no preference except to go where the
evidence leads. If this argument were put forth by anyone else than
a scientific philosopher, I would suggest that what he was doing
was psychoanalyzing the opposition-a game that we all can play.
Let us consider next the dichotomy with which our scientific
philosopher operates: On the one hand, .we have a doctrine supported
by empirical evidence and, on the other, mere dicta based
on dogmatic preference. No third alternative is conceivable. Truth
on the one side and error on the other. It is as simple as that.
But is it? The question of the "evidence" on which even the most
dogmatic of us and the most depraved victim of his, own. preference
holds his beliefs cannot be resolved by rigging up a simplistic
dichotomy. And to attempt to resolve it in this manner is to display
an ungenerous intolerance based on God knows what kind of
preference. Other philosophers arrive at their convictions in
much the same manner and for much the same kind of psychological
reasons as naturalists arrive at their views, by means of
much the same kind of evidence, and the differences between
them, if they can be settled at all, cannot be settled by means of
simplistic dichotomies.