Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

42 Scientism and Values
have added, on the state of opinion on inductive proof. If the
present opinion that all the evidence has to be in continues, on
this basis we shall not know what a fact is until Gabriel blows his
trumpet. Cohen and Nagel, let us remind ourselves, are writing
about logic and scientific method. Their definition is, the one most
popular today in scientific circles. It is substantially the same as
that of the logical positivists. Theirs. is that "all propositions which
have factual content are empirical hypotheses. . . ." 25 Another
popular definition is that "a fact is an empirically verifiable statement
about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme." 26 This
may be criticized on the grounds that time does not stop and keep
phenomena lying around conveniently for statements about them
to be verified. The phenomenon, like murder, is something that
happens, and once it has happened it is part of the past and you
can't bring the murdered person back to life and have the murderer
do the job all over again in order to verify statements that
may have been made about the first occurrence. As a final sample
we shall mention those schools of thought to which facts are configurations
of particles, or of energized particles, or of particles of
energy, and to which scientific knowledge is mathematical equations
correlating such configurations.
It occurs to us at this point, and the thought will not be repressed,
that the problem of objectivity now calls for the question:
Do any of these particles of energy have wings, and are some of
the wings white and others black? And then the thought comes, are
wings really necessary? And how many of these particles of energy
can dance on the point of a needle?
Now, in all seriousness, it is not necessary to reject this last
explanation of fact in the name of sanity. Plato was very close to
it, whether we follow Jowett in the view that Plato said, "The
definition of being is simply power," or Cornford, who translates
(Sophist 247E): "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real·
things that they are nothing but power." The difference between
Plato and the modern social scientist is that Plato's theory of facts
was systematic, relatively complete, and remarkably consistent.
The same is true of Aristotle. The best we can get from the social
scientist today is such exhortations as to distinguish between what