Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

88 Scientism and Values
Practically everyone, grants that not all of the terms in our
vocabulary refer to the same kind of thing. The difference between
those which refer to positive entities and those which refer
to dialectical ones is of decisive significance for the investigator.
"Positive" terms stand for observable objects capable of physical
identification and measurement. They are terms, whose referents
are things existing objectively in the world, whose presence supposedly
everyone can be brought to acknowledge. "Rock," "tree,"
and "house" are examples. Positive terms thus make up a "physicalist"
vocabulary, inasmuch as they represent the objects of
sensory perception (even when these have to be noted hy dials
and meters). Properly speaking, there cannot be an argument
about a positive term; there can be only a dispute, which is subject
to settlement by actual observation or measurement.
"Dialectical" terms com,e from a different source, because they
take their meaning from the world of idea and action. They are
words for essences and principles, and their meaning is reached
not through sensory perception, but through the logical processes
of definition, inclusion, exclusion, and implication. Since their
meaning depends on a concatenation of ideas, what they signify
cannot be divorced from the ideological position of the user as
revealed by the general context of his discourse. A scientist, as
we have noted, locates things in their empirical conjunction, but
the user of dialectic must locate the meaning of ,his entities in
the logical relationships of his system, and hence his discovery
of them cannot be an empirical discovery. For this reason we say
that the meaning of "justice" or "goodness" or "fair play" is not
"found," but rather "arrived at." It is implied by the world of
idea and attitude with which the user started. A dialectical term
does not stand for "motion," as the positive term out of science
might do, but for "action," which cannot be freed from the idea
of purpose and value.
The scientistic sociologist has tried to maintain his scientific
stance by endeavoring to give the impression that all the terms
he uses are positive and hence can be used with the same "objectivity"
and preciseness as those of the physical scientist. I say he
has endeavored to give the impression, because even an impres-