Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

26 Scientism and Values
have primary qualities. No one doubts that there are correlates of
such linguistic expressions as "chair," "table," "this person," etc.,
even though the questions how the correlates exist and how it is
that this existence is public and there can be communication
about it are in a state of extreme confusion. No one doubts that
there are correlates of such linguistic expressions as "yellow,"
"stench," "buzzing," "s.weet," "soft." Despite all confusion, it is
possible to point, or seem to point, to objects that exemplify, or
seem to exemplify, primary and secondary qualities, and scientific
means and standards are available for determining the relations
of these qualities to objects, whether the objects are in minds, or
in the external world or in both or are distributed among and
between the two or have some other unknown and perhaps unthinkable
status.
The situation is entirely different in regard to the question of
value. Here there is doubt about the existence of correlates. It is
possible, as we have seen, to verify statements about objects such
as chairs and tables in so far as these statements involve primary
and secondary qualities. But what of such statements as "This is
good" or "This is bad"? "The question really at issue," wrote G. E.
Moore more than a quarter century ago in his essay on the "Nature
of Moral Philosophy,"
is the question whether when we judge (whether truly or falsely) that
an action is a duty or a state of things good, all that we are thinking
about the action or the state of things in question is simply and solely
that we ourselves or others have or tend to have a certain feeling
towards it when we contemplate or think of it.... If this view be
true.... when I say "That was wrong" I am merely saying, "That sort
of action excites indignation in me, when I see it"-and when you
say "No; it was not wrong," you are merely saying, "It does not excite
indignation in me) when I see it." ...
"If this view be true," concludes Moore, "then there is absolutely
no such thing as a difference in opinion on moral questions." 4
David Hume stated the same problem when he wrote in his
Treatise on Human Nature: