Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

224 Scientism and Values
example, complex international problems can he swept conveniently
under the rug by reducing international relations to economic
equations: by assisting the underdeveloped countries economically,
the giver wins, if not their good will, then at least a
measure of toleration and, in the bargain, fosters the growth of
democracy, which, it is alleged, is correlated closely with the rise
of average standards of living. By ignoring unwieldy cultural factors
and deep-seated antagonisms to Western peoples and values,
one simplifies the problem of, let us say, India's place in what is
called euphemistically the "free world": the West, by adding just
the right amount of investment capital to India's government..
directed economic development, can secure the survival, in India,
of parliamentary government and, in world politics, assist India
in becoming a counterweight to Red China. Proposals for such a
Western "policy" toward India are loaded with eye-filling and vig..
orously formulated statistics. The trouble with this neat solution
-which, in the context of scientific economics, is perfectly plausible-is
that the soul of India is. not the soul of America, that Indians
cannot be equated with Chinese on the basis of per capita
economic productivity, and that, strictly speaking, India is not a
nation.
III
Since the social sciences are concerned with human action, an
explanation of data can hardly be satisfying and valid unless it relates
"objective" social phenomena to human purpose, intention,
and values. This approach is understandably at odds with that of
the natural scientist. It is also at odds with the idea of a centrally
planned and, therefore, centrally controlled society. The obstacle
to centralized, "scientific" planning is individual idiosyncrasy; i.e.,
individual purpose, intention, and values. The most expeditious
way around this obstacle is to assert that individual purpose, intention,
and values are scientifically irrelevant or trivial and impervious
to measurement and, therefore, should be left out of account.
Likewise, it is argued that historical institutions, because they are
the traditional repository of purpose, intention, and values, are not