Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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Objectivity <strong>and</strong> Social Science 29<br />
the physical world with nothing whatever in it that could even<br />
remotely be imagined as a correlate for fairness <strong>and</strong> impartiality,<br />
justice or injustice, good or evil, nothing that even suggests value.<br />
The point here for our purposes is that if all moral questions<br />
are illusory, if the feelings that people have about such matters as<br />
justice <strong>and</strong> good <strong>and</strong> evil <strong>and</strong> right <strong>and</strong> wrong have no correlates,<br />
if the nature of things is such that there cannot be any moral correlates<br />
either in states of affairs or states of mind, it is obvious<br />
that the pretension of the social scientist to objectivity as fairness<br />
or impartiality or justice is merely testimony concerning the state<br />
of his feelings, <strong>and</strong>, so far as the states beyond his feelings are<br />
concerned, his claim is wholly illusory. The social scientist lives<br />
in a world in which conflicts of world-wide proportions are occurring<br />
over what people imagine to be justice. He has made important<br />
contributions to the idea that these conflicts are really about<br />
justice. But when he is asked what this justice is, he is unable to<br />
say anything that is distinguishable from the appeal of the demagogue<br />
to the mob. And this is not all.<br />
One of the chief accomplishments of the social scientist during<br />
the last century or so has been to help undermine the notion that<br />
ideas of good <strong>and</strong> evil, better <strong>and</strong> worse are more than mere vagrant<br />
feelings. The charge that the social scientist wants to have a<br />
piece of moral objectivity, <strong>and</strong> that he has been preaching that<br />
there is no moral objectivity to have a piece of <strong>and</strong> that there<br />
cannot be any, is serious, <strong>and</strong> I now turn to evidence bearing on<br />
this charge.<br />
II<br />
The discussion that follows will seem to the reader petty unless<br />
he remembers that we are concerned here with problems of<br />
more than ordinary importance <strong>and</strong> that one of the first questions<br />
we have to ask of a piece of writing that is presented to the world<br />
as a contribution to knowledge is: Does the author know what he<br />
is talking about? Has he succeeded in underst<strong>and</strong>ing what he says?<br />
Has he solved the problem of reasoning, of communicating with<br />
himself?