Scientism and Values.pdf - Ludwig von Mises Institute

4 Scientism and Jlalues
large in the human world and cannot be brushed aside easily.
If only the advocates of the reduction of socialstudies to the level
of a natural science could get around the problem of values, they
would have clear sailing. The problem of values, therefore, occupies
a key position in this quest for an all-encompassing science.
An examination of the learned journals in the various fields
of the social sciences soon reveals, however, that it is not always
clear just what is meant by "the problem of value," or whether
any particular author regards it as one problem or as many.
There is evidence, on the contrary, that different authors mean
different things when, overtly or by implication, they are concerned
with values; that their perspectives differ; and that their
aims are at variance.
I submit that "the problem of value" occurs in the social
sciences in at least three basic forms; that these three forms must
be strictly separated if we are to solve "the" problem at all; and
that each form, in its own way, is ultimately related to an allinclusive
value theory, the broad outlines of which I hope to
indicate in a moment. And I submit, more specifically, that in
dealing with "the problem of value" in the present context we
must speak of (a) the value of the social sciences, (b) values in
the social sciences, and (c) values for the social sciences.
I
(a) The question of the value of the social sciences constitutes
no particular problem. Knowledge obtained in any field of inquiry
is of value to us-including the knowledge obtained in the social
sciences; and it is of value to us in a twofold sense. It is of value
(i) because knowledge of any kind satisfies man's innate curiosity;
and it is of value (ii) because knowledge and understanding are
of crucial importance as the basis for rational decisions and reasonable
actions.
As to (i), little need be said here. We must re.alize, however,
that man's innate curiosity-his desire· to know-is the driving
force behind much of our basic research. The personal satisfac-