Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biosphere - WBGU

282 H Valuing the biosphere: An ethical and economic perspective
human race. Accordingly, all interventions are categorically
prohibited in which important biogeochemical
or energy cycles are significantly influenced at a
global level and where globally effective negative
impacts are to be expected. Usually, no stringent
causal evidence of the harmful nature of globally
relevant interventions is needed; justified suspicion
of such harmfulness should suffice. The Council has
already laid down in detail in its 1998 risk report how
the problem of uncertainty in the event of possible
catastrophic damage potential should be dealt with
(Cassandra risk type; WBGU, 2000a).
On the second level, the protection of ecosystems
and landscapes, it is much more difficult to draw up
categorical rules. Initially, it is obvious that all interventions
in landscapes in which the global functions
mentioned on the first level are endangered must be
avoided. Furthermore, it is wise from a precautionary
point of view to maintain as much ecosystem diversity
as possible in order to keep the degree of vulnerability
to the unforeseen or even unforeseeable consequences
of human and non-human interventions as
low as possible. Even though it is difficult to derive
findings for human behaviour from observations of
evolution, the empirically proven statement ‘he who
wagers everything on one card, always loses in the
long run’ seems to demonstrate a universally valid
insight into the functioning of systemically organized
interactions. For this reason, the conservation of the
natural diversity of ecosystems and landscape forms
is a categorical principle, whereas the depth of intervention
allowed should be specified on the basis of
compensatory principles and standards.
The same can be said for the third level, genetic
and species conservation. Here too, initially the
causal chain should be laid down: species conservation,
landscape conservation, maintaining global
functions. Wherever there is conclusive evidence of
this chain, a categorical order of conservation should
apply. These species could be termed ‘primary keystone
species’. This includes those species that are
essential not only for the specific landscape type in
which they occur, but also for the global cycles above
and beyond that specific landscape type owing to
their special position in the ecosystem. Probably, it
will not be possible to organize all species under this
heading, but we could also think of groups of species,
for example humus-forming bacteria. In second place
there are the species that characterize certain ecosystems
or landscapes. Here they are referred to as ‘secondary
keystone species’. They, too, are under special
protection, but are not necessarily subject to categorical
reservation. Their functional value, however, is
worthy of special attention. Below these two types of
species there are the remaining species that perform
ecosystemic functions to a greater or lesser extent.
What this means for the worthiness of protection of
these species, and the point at which the precise limit
for permitted intervention should be drawn, is a
question that can no longer be solved with categorical
principles and standards but with the help of
compensatory principles and standards. Generally,
here too, as with the issue of ecosystem and landscape
protection, the conservation of diversity is recommended
as a strategy of ‘reinsurance’ against
ignorance, global risks and unforeseeable surprises.
It remains to be said that, from a systemic point of
view, a categorical ban has to apply to all human
interventions where global closed loops are demonstrably
at risk (WBGU guard rail principle model).
Furthermore, it makes sense to recognize the conservation
of landscape variety (also of ecosystemic
diversity within landscapes) and of genetic and
species diversity as basic principles, without thereby
being able to make categorical judgements about
individual landscape or species types as a result.
H 4.3
The use of compensatory principles and standards
in biosphere conservation
In order to be able to answer the question about the
valuation of partial infringements of compensatory
principles or standards, which are referred to in the
issue of conserving specific species or landscapes, we
need rules for decision-making that facilitate the
appreciation process. In the current debate about
rules for using the environment and nature it is
mainly teleological valuation methods that are proposed
(Hubig, 1993; Ott, 1993). These methods are
aimed at
1. estimating the possible consequences of various
options for action at all dimensions relevant to
potentially affected people,
2. identifying the infringement or fulfilment of these
expected consequences in the light of the guiding
standards and principles and
3. then weighting them according to an internal key
so that they can be weighed up in a balanced way.
On the positive side of the equation there are the
economic and cultural values created by use, for
example in the form of income, subsistence or an aesthetically
attractive landscape (parks, ornamental
gardens, etc); on the negative side there are the
destruction of current or future usage potentials, the
loss of unknown natural resources that may be
needed in the future and the violation of aesthetic,
cultural or religious attributes associated with the
environment and nature.
There are, therefore, related categories on both
sides of the equation: current uses vs possible uses in