Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biosphere - WBGU
Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biosphere - WBGU
Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biosphere - WBGU
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An attempt to rank <strong>the</strong> value categories from a global perspective H 5.6<br />
291<br />
tection provided that <strong>the</strong> social cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protection<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> biosphere does not become unacceptably high<br />
(<strong>WBGU</strong>, 1994).<br />
Within <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> safe minimum st<strong>and</strong>ards,<br />
using <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> species conservation, this would<br />
mean: How many potential benefits are lost to<br />
humankind if a safe minimum <strong>of</strong> protection for<br />
species is guaranteed? If it is assumed that every<br />
species has a positive value, <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>of</strong> systematic<br />
recording <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits are avoided by concentrating<br />
on <strong>the</strong> opportunity cost.At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong><br />
burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> is placed on those who want to<br />
exploit natural resources or prefer alternative uses<br />
that destroy species (<strong>WBGU</strong>, 1994).<br />
H 5.5.3<br />
Conclusions about <strong>the</strong> applicability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
economic valuation approach<br />
Both <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> non-substitutability <strong>and</strong> also <strong>the</strong><br />
risk <strong>of</strong> irreversibilities, linked to <strong>the</strong> uncertainty<br />
about future benefits, reveal <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
rationale based on individual preferences. As<br />
a consequence, a complete determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
values <strong>of</strong> biosphere services by means <strong>of</strong> individual<br />
valuations should be assessed sceptically. Two conclusions<br />
can be drawn:<br />
1. A determination <strong>of</strong> values <strong>of</strong> all biosphere services<br />
that is based on individual preferences is<br />
practically impossible. The only possibility to calculate<br />
a monetary value is to add to <strong>the</strong> overall<br />
economic value an ‘appropriate’ supplement that<br />
has been determined on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> individual<br />
valuations – directly via interviews or indirectly<br />
via market valuations. However, suitable scientific<br />
criteria for measuring such an ‘appropriate’ supplement<br />
are largely not in place, with <strong>the</strong> result<br />
that this supplement can only be derived qualitatively<br />
from expert knowledge. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
important demonstration function <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
valuations remains in place. The exact level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
economic value determined does not play <strong>the</strong><br />
decisive role <strong>the</strong>n. Instead, an approximate idea<br />
about <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem can be created<br />
without <strong>the</strong> determined value as such having to be<br />
taken too seriously.<br />
2. The inaccuracies that are unavoidable in <strong>the</strong><br />
determination <strong>of</strong> an economic value for biosphere<br />
services on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir character as a collective<br />
asset <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> insufficient knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
ecosystemic interrelationships illustrate that economic<br />
valuations cannot be <strong>the</strong> sole basis for political<br />
decisions. Economic valuation methods are<br />
thus only one <strong>of</strong> many assisting factors that can be<br />
used to make decisions. Here, in particular, ecological<br />
<strong>and</strong> social criteria should be included in <strong>the</strong><br />
weighing up process, unless <strong>the</strong>y can be integrated<br />
in an economic valuation. The results <strong>of</strong> valuation<br />
studies, <strong>the</strong>refore, need fur<strong>the</strong>r interpretation<br />
within <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> democratic decisionmaking<br />
process, irrespective <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r monetarization<br />
occurred, as was implied in this section<br />
when <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> applicability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
rationale were discussed. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it<br />
becomes obvious that valuation issues are always<br />
an economic-ethical problem (Hampicke, 1991),<br />
because <strong>the</strong> partial separation from <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong><br />
an individual valuation requires an ethical justification<br />
just as much as <strong>the</strong> economic approach<br />
itself. The confrontation <strong>of</strong> economics <strong>and</strong> ethics<br />
in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a conflict does not lead any fur<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
anyway. Instead, economics should be understood<br />
as an expression <strong>of</strong> certain valuation ethics.<br />
H 5.6<br />
An attempt to rank <strong>the</strong> value categories from a<br />
global perspective<br />
The large number <strong>of</strong> value dimensions clearly illustrates<br />
that decisions for weighing <strong>the</strong>m are needed.<br />
This need for weighing <strong>the</strong>m can be visualized if <strong>the</strong><br />
value categories are brought into a relation with <strong>the</strong><br />
three types <strong>of</strong> l<strong>and</strong>scape use (Section E 3.3.1). The<br />
l<strong>and</strong> use types refer to three categories: Type ‘E’<br />
means adequate protection despite intense use. Type<br />
‘N’ means dominance <strong>of</strong> protection over use. Type<br />
‘M’ means protection through sustainable use <strong>of</strong><br />
resources. Whereas with l<strong>and</strong>scape use type ‘E’ (conservation<br />
despite use) <strong>the</strong> economic benefit dominates,<br />
with l<strong>and</strong>scape use type ‘N’ (conservation<br />
before use) mainly <strong>the</strong> symbolic value, <strong>the</strong> option<br />
value <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence value are very high.The functional<br />
value is assigned special significance generally,<br />
because it plays <strong>the</strong> decisive role with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />
maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dominant goal for each l<strong>and</strong>scape<br />
use type, be it that it creates <strong>the</strong> ecological<br />
foundations for <strong>the</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
benefit (type ‘E’), or be it that <strong>the</strong> functional value<br />
determines <strong>the</strong> protection requirement <strong>of</strong> a l<strong>and</strong>scape<br />
(type ‘N’). With <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>scape use types, <strong>the</strong>refore,<br />
<strong>the</strong> question arises as to which values are used<br />
in <strong>the</strong> decision on l<strong>and</strong> use – <strong>and</strong> to what extent –<br />
because not all values can be maximized at <strong>the</strong> same<br />
time.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> more value dimensions that have to<br />
be considered in an appreciation process, <strong>the</strong> more<br />
complex <strong>the</strong> decisions become <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> more likely<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are to be distortions in <strong>the</strong> weighting, because<br />
most people tend to perceive certain value categories<br />
more consciously <strong>and</strong> to assess <strong>the</strong>ir value subjec-