LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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92 Chapter 3<br />
The phrase ‘within available resources’ has mostly been used in a<br />
rhetorical manner, without any meaningful attempts to define it and<br />
to understand the precise nature of the obligations it imposes. 179<br />
Unless we come to grips with the nature of the obligations that the<br />
requirement to act within the available gives rise to, it may be<br />
difficult to translate socio-economic rights from mere abstract paper<br />
rights to concrete individualised rights. 180 This is because the concept<br />
of available resources presents an obstacle to the realisation of these<br />
rights. However, the concept also represents the world of scarcity in<br />
which we live, which makes it impossible for the state to fully realise<br />
all the rights protected. Yet, at the same time, scarcity imposes an<br />
obligation on the state to ensure more efficient use of the scarce<br />
resources in order to realise the rights to the extent attainable in the<br />
circumstances.<br />
Looked at narrowly, the concept of acting ‘within available<br />
resources’ is available to the state as a defence to justify its failure<br />
to fully realise socio-economic rights or even to provide a minimum<br />
level of goods and services. Indeed, in the majority of socio-economic<br />
rights cases, the state is always quick to demonstrate that it lacks the<br />
resources needed to fully realise the right(s). 181 Nonetheless, the<br />
179<br />
180<br />
181<br />
According to Chapman, we cannot effectively use the standard of progressive<br />
realisation as a tool of assessing compliance with the standards established by<br />
ICESCR unless we understand what is meant by the phrase ‘maximum of its<br />
available resources’. A Chapman ‘A new approach to monitoring the International<br />
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International<br />
Commission of Jurists: The Review 23 26. All that the ESCR Committee has said in<br />
General Comment No 3 about the meaning of the phrase ‘the maximum of the<br />
available resources’ is that it was ‘intended by the drafters of the Covenant to<br />
refer to both the resources existing within a state and those available from the<br />
international community through international co-operation and assistance’ (para<br />
13). In my opinion, this is very narrow; surely, the drafters must have meant more<br />
than this in this phrase. ICESCR, besides elaborating the obligations of<br />
international co-operation, does not elucidate on what states have to do within<br />
the domestic arena to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for the<br />
purpose of realising the rights. Yet, as argued in ch two sec 2.2.4, the various<br />
methods employed by the ESCR Committee to determine the appropriateness of<br />
resources dedicated to realisation of the rights are flawed in a number of<br />
respects.<br />
E Robertson ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation to devote the<br />
“maximum available resources” to realising economic, social and cultural rights’<br />
(1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 694.<br />
See, eg, the Soobramoney (n 19 above), Grootboom (n 16 above) and Khosa<br />
cases.