LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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The structural interdict 195<br />
stated time and to report on the same. However, as is noted below, 147<br />
the court should gravitate towards such intrusiveness only when it is<br />
absolutely necessary to do so. 148 The circumstances that determine<br />
the level of intervention are detailed under the discussion of norms<br />
and principles below. 149<br />
In conclusion, therefore, the separation of powers objection is not<br />
totally unfounded. Courts should not use the structural interdict to<br />
assume functions of other organs of state as of first resort. I submit in<br />
this chapter that using the structural interdict should be a matter of<br />
last resort and only where there is evidence of failure on the part of<br />
government to exercise its discretion. 150 It is this degree of failure<br />
and extent of government recalcitrance that should dictate the level<br />
of judicial intrusion.<br />
6.4.2 Corrective justice-type arguments<br />
As seen in chapter four, 151 the theory of corrective justice requires<br />
that victims of violations be put in the position they were in before<br />
the violation occurred. It is on the basis of this principle that the<br />
structural interdict has been condemned for its failure to put victims<br />
in the position they would have been but for the violations. Nagel, for<br />
instance, refers to the US school desegregation cases and submits that<br />
these cases did not benefit the students who had been illegally<br />
segregated and who instituted the actions. 152 The orders were instead<br />
directed at making structural reforms that would only bring about<br />
change in the long run.<br />
The structural interdict also contravenes the notion of corrective<br />
justice by adopting unconventional mechanisms of adjudication. As<br />
seen above, 153 for instance, the structural interdict may force judges<br />
to ignore the principle of functus officio by allowing courts to retain<br />
jurisdiction. It is, for example, on the basis of the functus officio<br />
principle that an appellate court in Canada set aside a decision by a<br />
lower court to retain supervisory jurisdiction in Doucet-Boudreau v<br />
147<br />
Sec 6.6.<br />
148 Horowitz (n 133 above) 24 concedes that where there is reticence on the part of<br />
other branches as regards policy decision making, however imperfect a judicial<br />
remedy is, it may be the best available due to the absence of performance by<br />
other branches. Horowitz could be read as suggesting that in a situation of a<br />
recalcitrant government, the courts have to use all kinds of creative means to<br />
protect the values and rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The structural<br />
interdict is an example of such creative remedies used to achieve compliance<br />
with court orders.<br />
149<br />
Sec 6.6.1.<br />
150 See sec 6.6.1.<br />
151 Sec 4.2.1.<br />
152<br />
Nagel (n 136 above) 402.<br />
153 Sec 6.3.1.