LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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The structural interdict 187<br />
third party interests, the judge may intervene and fashion the<br />
remedy. 115<br />
Legislative/administrative hearing model<br />
The legislative/administrative hearing model resembles a legislative<br />
committee process providing for public hearings and direct informal<br />
participation by interested parties. 116 This model allows persons not<br />
originally party to the litigation, but who may be interested in the<br />
case, to participate in the formulation of the remedy. It is an<br />
effective model in responding to polycentric interests that may be<br />
implicated by the case.<br />
Like the bargaining model, this model allows the court to<br />
appreciate facts and issues as brought to the fore by those attending<br />
at the hearing. These are facts and issues that may probably have not<br />
come out in court but relevant to finding an appropriate remedy. Yet,<br />
unlike the bargaining model, which may be restricted to identified<br />
parties, the legislative hearing model is more easily opened for third<br />
parties to express their views<br />
An example of a case where this model was used is the US case of<br />
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v Pennsylvania. 117 In<br />
this case, in addition to conducting extensive informal public<br />
hearings, the judge established an advisory committee composed of<br />
representatives of the various groups and organisations with a stake<br />
in the case. The mandate of the committee was to advise on an<br />
appropriate remedy, 118 which was deemed necessary because of the<br />
multitude of people interested in the outcome of the case. Their<br />
participation made it possible for the different views and divergences<br />
to be brought to the fore. However, as discussed below, 119<br />
participation should not be inflated to such an extent that the process<br />
becomes muddled, making it hard for the Committee to make a<br />
decision.<br />
115<br />
Sturm (n 63 above) 1415 submits that the bargaining model fails to provide for<br />
mechanisms for fostering the accountability of the participants in the negotiation<br />
process to those they represent. He contends that, where lawyers are involved,<br />
the bargaining closely follows an adversarial model of presentation. Sturm also<br />
submits that usually the bargaining model tends to lay emphasis on reaching<br />
agreement and proceeds according to an adversary structure which narrows the<br />
terms of the discussion and inhibits meaningful exchange (1416). The lawyers<br />
control the agenda and the process of negotiation. It is, therefore, important for<br />
the court to ensure the participation of those affected and accountability to them<br />
through, eg, the legislative and hearing model.<br />
116 Sturm (n 63 above) 1370.<br />
117 334 F Supp 1257 (ED Pa 1971) (PARC case).<br />
118<br />
See Sturm (n 63 above) 1370.<br />
119 Sec 6.6.2.