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LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

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44 Chapter 2<br />

that these will vary according to factors such as income,<br />

unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences<br />

between city and rural communities will also determine the needs and<br />

opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately<br />

depend on the economic and social history and circumstances of a<br />

country. The Court said that, unlike the ESCR Committee, it did not<br />

have access to the information that would enable it to define the<br />

minimum core. 141<br />

It is necessary for courts enforcing socio-economic rights to<br />

confront the problem of polycentricism. Appreciation of the extent of<br />

the polycentric nature of a socio-economic rights case will be a factor<br />

to consider when designing an ‘appropriate just and equitable relief’.<br />

This is important because ‘[t]he harm caused by violating<br />

constitutional rights is not merely a harm to an individual applicant,<br />

but a harm to society as a whole’. 142 Constitutional litigation against<br />

the state in most cases arises from violations of a structural nature<br />

implicating a number of interests. Addressing such structural<br />

violations calls for significant structural and institutional changes not<br />

only involving, but also affecting persons other than the parties. 143 As<br />

a result of this, the appropriateness of a remedy will be affected<br />

unless the court considers all the interests implicated by a case.<br />

Socio-economic rights cases are believed to be polycentric in<br />

nature, firstly, because of the conception that they have budgetary<br />

consequences. 144 It is submitted that each decision to allocate a<br />

particular sum of money for a specified purpose implies less money for<br />

other purposes. 145 According to Davis, a case involving a person’s<br />

right to a house would not only impact on that person and the state,<br />

but also on interests of other citizens. The interests of other citizens<br />

would raise questions such as whether the money should be used to<br />

build a crèche, a hospital or sporting stadium. 146<br />

141 Paras 32-33.<br />

142 Currie & De Waal (n 95 above) 196.<br />

143<br />

Sturm (n 116 above) 1364. Fiss gives the example of a structural order to reform<br />

the practices of a police department as having an effect upon all the individual<br />

police officers, present and future. O Fiss ‘Foreword: The forms of justice’ (1979)<br />

93 Harvard Law Review 1 49.<br />

144 Budgets, it is believed, are finite in nature and have a multitude of ways in which<br />

to be distributed. See Pieterse (n 78 above) 393.<br />

145<br />

K O'Regan ‘Introducing socio-economic rights’ (1999) 1 ESR Review 2. Currie & De<br />

Waal (n 95 above) 570 give Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)<br />

1998 1 SA 765 (CC) (Soobramoney case) as an example of a polycentric case.<br />

According to Currie and De Waal, if the Constitutional Court had decided that<br />

Soobramoney was entitled to dialysis treatment, the decision would not only have<br />

affected the individual, but also the complex web of mutually interacting<br />

resource allocations.<br />

146 Davis (n 72 above) 478.

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