LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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100 Chapter 3<br />
All that the courts would have to do is demand justification from the<br />
state. In doing this, the courts would be guided by principles such as<br />
reasonableness, proportionality and the content of the rights. 213 This<br />
is in addition to the promotion of the constitutional values of<br />
accountability, openness and responsiveness.<br />
3.3 Conclusion<br />
This chapter has shown that, while the reasonableness review<br />
approach has the potential to lead to the realisation of socioeconomic<br />
rights, it has a number of loopholes that have to be plugged.<br />
The court must appreciate the fact that resources play a role in<br />
determining whether the minimum core obligation has been<br />
discharged and provides the state with a possible defence. This,<br />
though, would shift the burden to the state to show that every effort<br />
is being made to provide for basic needs in the circumstances. This<br />
approach would compel the state to be more responsive to the needs<br />
of the poor, by directing resources to those living below the minimum<br />
core standard. It is true that the minimum core approach poses a<br />
danger of defining socio-economic rights rigidly and a-contextually,<br />
which means imposing rigid standards irrespective of the context.<br />
Nonetheless, this danger can be obviated by defining the minimum<br />
core using broad parameters which are then made applicable on a<br />
case-by-case basis. This is in addition to giving a margin of discretion<br />
to the state to choose the most effective means of realising the<br />
minimum core in each context.<br />
The Constitutional Court’s reasonableness review approach has<br />
also failed to give content to the rights, most especially as guaranteed<br />
by sections 26(1) and 27(1). Without any analysis of the content of the<br />
rights, the Court rushes to consider the obligation to take reasonable<br />
measures to progressively realise the rights within the available<br />
resources as stipulated in sections 26(2) and 27(2). This has left the<br />
beneficiaries of the rights without any clue as to the nature of the<br />
services to which they are entitled. Going by the approach of the<br />
Constitutional Court, all that the claimants can demand from the<br />
state is a reasonable programme undertaken within available<br />
resources to progressively realise the rights. This poses the danger of<br />
the reasonableness review approach degenerating into ‘a weak and<br />
toothless standard’. 214 The Court’s approach has also left it without<br />
any tools that could be used to interrogate the effectiveness of the<br />
213 This is consistent with the values of accountability, responsiveness and openness,<br />
as well as with the spirit of the Constitution as a bridge from a culture of<br />
authoritarianism to a culture of justification; a culture in which all exercise of<br />
public power has to be justified. See Mureinik (n 128 above).<br />
214<br />
S Liebenberg ‘Making a pro-poor Constitution’ Mail & Guardian 12-18 May 2006<br />
26.