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LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

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172 Chapter 6<br />

is not prepared to abide by any order against it in a pending case<br />

compelling government to provide Nevirapine. 35<br />

The Constitutional Court has asserted its powers to grant<br />

mandatory interdicts as part of ‘appropriate, just and equitable<br />

relief’. The Court has rejected submissions that the only order it can<br />

make against the government in constitutional litigation is a<br />

declaratory order. It had been submitted that the Court was<br />

prevented by the doctrine of separation of powers from granting a<br />

mandatory interdict as this would amount to requiring the executive<br />

to pursue a particular policy. 36 According to the Constitutional Court,<br />

there is no distinction between a mandatory order and a declaratory<br />

order because they both affect state policy and may have budgetary<br />

implications. This is because the government is constitutionally bound<br />

to give effect to both mandatory and declaratory orders. 37<br />

I do endorse the holding that government is constitutionally bound<br />

to carry out declaratory orders in the same way as mandatory orders.<br />

In my opinion, however, the distinction between declaratory and<br />

mandatory order becomes clear when government disregards its<br />

constitutional obligations. As mentioned in chapter five, 38<br />

declaratory orders once disobeyed cannot be enforced in the same<br />

way as the interdict. The interdict can be followed by contempt of<br />

court proceedings to secure compliance from the state. This explains<br />

why it was easy for those dissatisfied with the implementation of the<br />

TAC case order in some provinces to secure compliance. 39 This should<br />

be contrasted with the position of those dissatisfied with the<br />

implementation of the judgment in Government of the Republic of<br />

South Africa v Grootboom and Others 40 (Grootboom case) whose only<br />

35 This was the situation in the TAC case where the minister of health stated, on<br />

public television, that the government would not abide by the judgment of the<br />

Court. See D Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core:<br />

Laying the foundations for a future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003)<br />

19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 23-24. Though at the end of the case<br />

evidence had emerged that the government was prepared to abide by the<br />

judgment, the commitment was too fluid to merit a declaratory order alone. The<br />

Constitutional Court therefore made a mandatory order, compelling the<br />

government to remove, without delay, the restrictions that prevented Nevirapine<br />

from being made available at public hospitals and clinics that had not been<br />

designated research and training sites. Indeed, subsequent events proved the<br />

usefulness of the mandatory interdict as some provinces had to be threatened<br />

with contempt of court order citations to extract an undertaking from them to<br />

abide by the order. See TAC v MEC for Health, Mpumalanga and Minister of<br />

Health TPD Case 35272/02 (unreported) (TAC Mpumalanga case). See also M<br />

Heywood ‘Contempt or compliance? The TAC case after the Constitutional Court<br />

judgment’ (2003) 4 ESR Review 7.<br />

36<br />

TAC case paras 97-98.<br />

37 TAC case para 99.<br />

38 Sec 5.3.2.<br />

39<br />

See TAC Mpumalanga case (n 35 above) and Heywood (n 35 above).<br />

40 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 1 SA 46 (CC).

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