LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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Translating socio-economic rights 67<br />
Provision of a minimum core therefore can be justified only in<br />
circumstances where non-provision cannot be ‘justified by the state<br />
and where it is appropriate in the circumstances to order that the<br />
claimant be provided with the benefit’. 66 The state could still argue<br />
that it does not have the resources to meet the minimum core<br />
immediately. This, however, would not mean that the state is<br />
completely exculpated; it has to ensure maximum protection of the<br />
rights in the circumstances. This point is discussed in more detail<br />
later.<br />
In addition to the problem of resources, one of the reasons why<br />
the Constitutional Court has declined to define the minimum core<br />
obligation is because of a conviction that people’s needs vary. This<br />
links to the problem of polycentricism as discussed in chapter two. 67<br />
The Court has, for instance, observed that determination of a<br />
minimum core in the context of ‘the right to have access to adequate<br />
housing’ presents difficult questions. According to the Court, this is so<br />
because the needs in the context of access to adequate housing are<br />
diverse: ‘There are those who need land; others need both land and<br />
houses; yet others need financial assistance.’ 68<br />
This means that the minimum core is oblivious to context and the<br />
diversified needs that context gives rise to. The Constitutional Court’s<br />
concerns have been broadened and endorsed by Liebenberg. She<br />
submits that the minimum core closes down debate and artificially<br />
curtails the evolution of standards of defining social needs as<br />
struggles around them unfold. 69 Liebenberg perceives the minimum<br />
core as setting rigid standards as to what the basic needs are; these<br />
standards ‘would be insensitive to the varying circumstances of<br />
differently situated groups in society’. 70 This is what has motivated<br />
Liebenberg to retract her support for the minimum core obligations<br />
approach and to give backing to the reasonableness review approach.<br />
She submits that the reasonableness review approach is more suited<br />
for contextual application because of its flexibility arising from its<br />
66 M Pieterse ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: Constitutional entitlement to<br />
health services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 473 483.<br />
67 Sec 2.3.4.<br />
68 Para 33.<br />
69<br />
S Liebenberg ‘Needs rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights’ (2005)<br />
Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 8 27 sourced at<br />
http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/wp/Liebenberg%20%20Needs,%20Rights%20and%20Tr<br />
ansformation.pdf (accessed 23 March 2006). Also published in (2006) 17<br />
Stellenbosch Law Review 5.<br />
70 S Liebenberg, ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’<br />
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 24. See also Pieterse (n 56<br />
above) 491.