04.06.2014 Views

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Translating socio-economic rights 67<br />

Provision of a minimum core therefore can be justified only in<br />

circumstances where non-provision cannot be ‘justified by the state<br />

and where it is appropriate in the circumstances to order that the<br />

claimant be provided with the benefit’. 66 The state could still argue<br />

that it does not have the resources to meet the minimum core<br />

immediately. This, however, would not mean that the state is<br />

completely exculpated; it has to ensure maximum protection of the<br />

rights in the circumstances. This point is discussed in more detail<br />

later.<br />

In addition to the problem of resources, one of the reasons why<br />

the Constitutional Court has declined to define the minimum core<br />

obligation is because of a conviction that people’s needs vary. This<br />

links to the problem of polycentricism as discussed in chapter two. 67<br />

The Court has, for instance, observed that determination of a<br />

minimum core in the context of ‘the right to have access to adequate<br />

housing’ presents difficult questions. According to the Court, this is so<br />

because the needs in the context of access to adequate housing are<br />

diverse: ‘There are those who need land; others need both land and<br />

houses; yet others need financial assistance.’ 68<br />

This means that the minimum core is oblivious to context and the<br />

diversified needs that context gives rise to. The Constitutional Court’s<br />

concerns have been broadened and endorsed by Liebenberg. She<br />

submits that the minimum core closes down debate and artificially<br />

curtails the evolution of standards of defining social needs as<br />

struggles around them unfold. 69 Liebenberg perceives the minimum<br />

core as setting rigid standards as to what the basic needs are; these<br />

standards ‘would be insensitive to the varying circumstances of<br />

differently situated groups in society’. 70 This is what has motivated<br />

Liebenberg to retract her support for the minimum core obligations<br />

approach and to give backing to the reasonableness review approach.<br />

She submits that the reasonableness review approach is more suited<br />

for contextual application because of its flexibility arising from its<br />

66 M Pieterse ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: Constitutional entitlement to<br />

health services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 473 483.<br />

67 Sec 2.3.4.<br />

68 Para 33.<br />

69<br />

S Liebenberg ‘Needs rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights’ (2005)<br />

Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 8 27 sourced at<br />

http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/wp/Liebenberg%20%20Needs,%20Rights%20and%20Tr<br />

ansformation.pdf (accessed 23 March 2006). Also published in (2006) 17<br />

Stellenbosch Law Review 5.<br />

70 S Liebenberg, ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’<br />

(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 24. See also Pieterse (n 56<br />

above) 491.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!