LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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66 Chapter 3<br />
the state cannot afford it. 62 It is, however, evident that the Court’s<br />
conclusion is not based on any evidence adduced by the state to prove<br />
that it is impossible on its part to satisfy the minimum core. Contrary<br />
to the assertion in the Grootboom case that the Court cannot define<br />
the minimum core without sufficient information before it, the<br />
Constitutional Court in the TAC case, without any evidence, closes the<br />
possibility of the minimum core by describing it as something that is<br />
impossible to realise.<br />
The Court ignores the fact that there is an evidential burden on<br />
the state not only to prove that the resources are inadequate, but also<br />
that it is striving to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the rights<br />
in the circumstances. 63 The Constitutional Court ignores the need for<br />
this evidential burden and makes its own assumptions, unsupported<br />
by evidence, that the state does not have the resources to satisfy the<br />
minimum core. The state should also have been required to show that<br />
every effort is being exhausted towards meeting the basic needs in<br />
the circumstances. 64 This is because the notion of minimum core does<br />
not require that minimum levels of goods and services be provided<br />
irrespective of circumstances that may make this impossible. 65<br />
62 During the hearing of the case, one of the judges, Justice Sachs, engaged counsel<br />
in questions that sent the message that the minimum core was impossible. Justice<br />
Sachs asked counsel whether the minimum core meant that somebody living in<br />
the mountains could come to court and say that he wants water from a tap, even<br />
if the money spent on this demand would furnish water for 10 000 people on the<br />
lower plain. See A Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The<br />
Grootboom case’ in J Peris & S Kristian (eds) Democratising development: The<br />
politics of socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 150. However, this is a<br />
total disregard of the views of the ESCR Committee that ‘resources play [a role]<br />
in assessing whether or not a country has discharged its minimum core obligations<br />
and that a state could attribute its failure to discharge the obligation to<br />
inadequacy of resources’.<br />
63<br />
The ESCR Committee has said that the availability of resources plays a role in<br />
determining whether a state has violated its minimum core obligations. However,<br />
a state must ‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources<br />
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those<br />
minimum obligations’. General Comment No 3 para 10. The ESCR Committee has<br />
added that ‘even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate,<br />
the obligation remains for the state party to strive to ensure the widest possible<br />
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances’ (para 11).<br />
The Committee goes on to state that, moreover, the obligations to monitor the<br />
extent of the realisation, or more especially of the non-realisation, of socioeconomic<br />
rights and to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are<br />
not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints (para 11). See also S<br />
Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: The role of the South African<br />
Human Rights Commission’ in P Andrews & S Ellman (eds) The post-apartheid<br />
constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s basic law (2001) 419.<br />
64<br />
Wesson (n 50 above) 302. According to Pieterse (n 8 above), the Constitutional<br />
Court’s rejection of the minimum core on the assumption that it would always<br />
lead to immediately enforceable entitlements against the state seems to indicate<br />
an ignorance of the function of the minimum core in international law, which<br />
expressly situates the concept within an overarching framework of progressive<br />
realisation and indicates that there may be circumstances in which noncompliance<br />
with the core obligations may be justified.<br />
65 Pieterse (n 7 above) 142.