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LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

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The structural interdict 181<br />

defined with greater and greater specificity. Ultimately, after many<br />

cycles of supplemental decrees, the ordinary contempt sanctions may<br />

become realistically available, but the point to emphasise is that it is<br />

only then — only at the end of a series — that the threat of contempt<br />

becomes credible. 86<br />

The factors propelling such specificity are discussed later in this<br />

chapter, 87 but it is mainly the inadequacy of the steps taken by the<br />

defendant, or even the degree of recalcitrance exhibited. According<br />

to Fiss, the gradualism of the structural sanctioning system might be<br />

attributable to political considerations (such as a desire to ‘go slow’<br />

so as to build wide popular support for the remedial enterprise). He<br />

argues that, although it might be said that it reflects ambivalence<br />

toward the underlying decree, the gradualism has deeper roots:<br />

uncertainties in the goal to be achieved (for example, what is a<br />

‘unitary non-racial’ school system) or shortcomings in our knowledge<br />

and ability to restructure ongoing institutions. 88 The gradualism also<br />

helps the court juggle around a number of options in its search for the<br />

most effective way of remedying the violation. It is not until the court<br />

has decided on what it considers the most appropriate means of<br />

remedying the violation that it concretises the order. 89 I discuss this<br />

point in detail below. 90<br />

Retention of jurisdiction<br />

The most peculiar feature of the structural interdict is the court’s<br />

retention of jurisdiction over the case even after judgment has been<br />

passed. The courts have disregarded the traditional functus officio<br />

doctrine, which requires that, once a court has made a final<br />

determination of a matter, its jurisdiction over the case ceases and<br />

the case is closed. 91 Although the case can be reopened, conventional<br />

legal procedures put in place stringent legal requirements that have<br />

to be satisfied before this is done.<br />

Retention of jurisdiction by the court helps a party who thinks<br />

that the order is not being complied with to bring this to the attention<br />

of the court. It also helps the persons to whom the order is directed,<br />

in certain circumstances, to seek clarity from the court as regards<br />

what the order entails. Courts have also retained jurisdiction to<br />

enable them to participate sporadically in the administration of the<br />

86 Fiss (n 6 above) 36 (emphasis in original).<br />

87<br />

See sec 6.6.1 below.<br />

88 Fiss (n 6 above) 36.<br />

89 Cooper-Stephenson (n 7 above) 36. See also Fiss (n 6 above) 36.<br />

90<br />

Sec 6.6.1.<br />

91 For a detailed discussion of the functus officio doctrine, see M Pretorius ‘The<br />

origins of the functus officio doctrine, with specific reference to its application in<br />

administrative law’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 832. See also Special<br />

Project (n 66 above) 816.

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