LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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Translating socio-economic rights 73<br />
especially of those who are in dire need. 91 Progressive improvement<br />
for those who already have a minimum level has to wait until<br />
everyone has had access to the basic needs. 92 But this does not mean<br />
that the state does not have any obligations towards those living<br />
above the minimum level. The state should avoid creating conditions<br />
that cripple the ability of those living above minimum levels to meet<br />
their needs on their own. The creation of such negative conditions<br />
would amount to retrogressive measures which are in themselves<br />
prima facie violations. 93<br />
The problem with the Grootboom case is that, while it requires<br />
protection of the needs of the most vulnerable, it does not require<br />
that provision for such needs should be high on the agenda. 94 All the<br />
Constitutional Court says is that the needs of such people should not<br />
be ignored by measures intended to realise the right for all in the long<br />
run. The Court demands that there should be a programme which is<br />
inclusive and possibly spreads resources to meet the short, medium<br />
and long-term needs simultaneously. 95 This approach therefore is<br />
about inclusiveness without compulsion that the state gives high<br />
priority to the needs of the most vulnerable. Indeed, in a recent<br />
paper, Liebenberg has described the reasonableness approach as a<br />
91<br />
According to Bilchitz (n 34 above) 15, the minimum core is a means of specifying<br />
priorities. It involves an injunction that priority must be given to those in a<br />
condition where their survival is threatened. He adds that any government<br />
programme must consider the needs of people in such a situation and assist them<br />
as a matter of priority. Blichitz adds further that the state cannot treat such<br />
people as representing one problem to be dealt with amongst others.<br />
92<br />
According to Liebenberg (n 70 above), the best approach would be one that in the<br />
first place requires the state to ensure that everyone has access to the minimum<br />
core and then, in the second place, the state must over time improve the quality<br />
of socio-economic rights to which individuals have access.<br />
93 The ESCR Committee has said that any deliberate retrogressive measures would<br />
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by<br />
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the<br />
context of the full use of the maximum available resources. General Comment No<br />
3 (para 3).<br />
94 See Roux (n 83 above) 42 47. Roux has said that, even if the South African<br />
government takes the Grootboom order seriously, this will only have an impact on<br />
the state’s budget, but will not have an impact on the temporal order in which<br />
competing needs are met. In Roux’s opinion, it is only the wholesome adoption of<br />
paragraph 10 of General Comment No 3 that would have required the government<br />
to devote all available resources to meet the needs of those without any kind of<br />
shelter before moving on to improving the life condition of everyone (47). See<br />
also Pieterse (n 8 above) 896. Roux has argued in another paper that had the<br />
Court required the government to prioritise the needs of those who need a<br />
minimum core over those who do not, it would have put itself in direct<br />
confrontation with the political branches whose duty it is to make budgetary<br />
allocations, that this is because the Court would have been substituting its views<br />
on resource allocation for those of the political branches (Roux (n 12 above) 97-<br />
98). However, it is submitted in this chapter that the minimum core could still be<br />
implemented in a manner that gives appropriate deference to the political<br />
branches. As mentioned above, the Court would have to define the minimum core<br />
using broad parameters and leave it to the state to choose the most appropriate<br />
means for its realisation.<br />
95 See para 43 of the case.