LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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Translating socio-economic rights 101<br />
means that have been chosen to realise the rights. The means cannot<br />
be assessed without an understanding of the goal to be realised,<br />
which is the content of the rights. It is only when the Court has given<br />
content to the rights that it will then be able to subject the state’s<br />
measures to a proportionality and rational connection test as<br />
suggested in this chapter. 215<br />
This chapter has also shown how useful a proportionality test,<br />
similar to the one applied under the general limitation clause, can be<br />
to socio-economic rights litigation. In socio-economic rights litigation,<br />
courts would have to weigh up the competing interests as brought to<br />
the fore by the state’s assertions that providing a particular service<br />
would prejudice certain legitimate interests. This is in addition to<br />
questioning whether there is a rational connection between the<br />
means chosen by the state to realise the rights and the goal to be<br />
realised. The courts would also have to be convinced that there are<br />
no less damaging means by which the rights could have been limited.<br />
This approach imposes a higher burden of justification on the state<br />
and puts the government under pressure to adopt the most<br />
appropriate means of realising the rights in each case. It is only such<br />
an approach that can translate socio-economic rights from mere<br />
abstract paper rights to concrete rights capable of improving the<br />
conditions of the vulnerable. This approach will compel the courts to<br />
reflect on their remedial approach and to grant those remedies that<br />
guarantee the concrete nature of the rights. The adoption of this<br />
approach does not suggest in any manner that the court is being<br />
disrespectful to the elected branches of the state; rather, it<br />
reinforces the constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness<br />
and openness.<br />
A similar standard of justification would be used to enable the<br />
courts to effectively interrogate the reasonableness of the resources<br />
allocated to the realisation of socio-economic rights. At the moment,<br />
the Constitutional Court’s approach to the issue of resources is still<br />
deficient. The Court has mostly deferred to the state to decide the<br />
most appropriate way of using resources. However, while courts<br />
cannot assume the role of appropriating budgets and resources, they<br />
may require the state to justify its budgetary allocations. 216 A burden<br />
would be imposed on the state to prove not only that its resources are<br />
limited, but also that the existing resources have been applied<br />
appropriately. 217 In certain circumstances, the state would have to<br />
215 Sec 4.2.3.2 above.<br />
216 Fredman (n 25 above) 182 has argued that the existence of a right does not mean<br />
that courts need to make primary decisions about the allocation of resources;<br />
instead, it requires the courts to insist that decision makers take responsibility for<br />
the decisions ‘by providing open, transparent, and reasonable reasons, based on<br />
proper evidence rather than generalisation or assumptions’.<br />
217 See Russell (n 40 above) 16.