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LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

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Translating socio-economic rights 101<br />

means that have been chosen to realise the rights. The means cannot<br />

be assessed without an understanding of the goal to be realised,<br />

which is the content of the rights. It is only when the Court has given<br />

content to the rights that it will then be able to subject the state’s<br />

measures to a proportionality and rational connection test as<br />

suggested in this chapter. 215<br />

This chapter has also shown how useful a proportionality test,<br />

similar to the one applied under the general limitation clause, can be<br />

to socio-economic rights litigation. In socio-economic rights litigation,<br />

courts would have to weigh up the competing interests as brought to<br />

the fore by the state’s assertions that providing a particular service<br />

would prejudice certain legitimate interests. This is in addition to<br />

questioning whether there is a rational connection between the<br />

means chosen by the state to realise the rights and the goal to be<br />

realised. The courts would also have to be convinced that there are<br />

no less damaging means by which the rights could have been limited.<br />

This approach imposes a higher burden of justification on the state<br />

and puts the government under pressure to adopt the most<br />

appropriate means of realising the rights in each case. It is only such<br />

an approach that can translate socio-economic rights from mere<br />

abstract paper rights to concrete rights capable of improving the<br />

conditions of the vulnerable. This approach will compel the courts to<br />

reflect on their remedial approach and to grant those remedies that<br />

guarantee the concrete nature of the rights. The adoption of this<br />

approach does not suggest in any manner that the court is being<br />

disrespectful to the elected branches of the state; rather, it<br />

reinforces the constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness<br />

and openness.<br />

A similar standard of justification would be used to enable the<br />

courts to effectively interrogate the reasonableness of the resources<br />

allocated to the realisation of socio-economic rights. At the moment,<br />

the Constitutional Court’s approach to the issue of resources is still<br />

deficient. The Court has mostly deferred to the state to decide the<br />

most appropriate way of using resources. However, while courts<br />

cannot assume the role of appropriating budgets and resources, they<br />

may require the state to justify its budgetary allocations. 216 A burden<br />

would be imposed on the state to prove not only that its resources are<br />

limited, but also that the existing resources have been applied<br />

appropriately. 217 In certain circumstances, the state would have to<br />

215 Sec 4.2.3.2 above.<br />

216 Fredman (n 25 above) 182 has argued that the existence of a right does not mean<br />

that courts need to make primary decisions about the allocation of resources;<br />

instead, it requires the courts to insist that decision makers take responsibility for<br />

the decisions ‘by providing open, transparent, and reasonable reasons, based on<br />

proper evidence rather than generalisation or assumptions’.<br />

217 See Russell (n 40 above) 16.

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