LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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South Africa: Distributive or corrective justice 145<br />
level to deter future infringement; 81 as submitted above. If damages<br />
are minimal and ‘affordable’ to certain actors, it may fall within their<br />
accepted cost-benefit analysis.<br />
Weaknesses with the deterrence (distributive) effect of damages<br />
There are, however, a number of weaknesses in the deterrence effect<br />
as based on the concept of law and economics. First, sometimes<br />
damages are not calculated on the basis of the gains that the violator<br />
may derive from the infringements. This is because, in some cases it<br />
may be impossible to express the gains in monetary terms. This makes<br />
it hard to calculate, with precision, the amount of damages that<br />
outweigh the benefits to be derived from the violation. The damages<br />
awarded may therefore be less than what would lead to deterrence or<br />
may be overly excessive. In the same line, when government infringes<br />
rights, for instance, it may not view the benefits of such infringement<br />
in monetary terms. Yet the political gains derived may in the<br />
government’s opinion outweigh any damages likely to arise from a<br />
finding of a violation. The government may therefore be prepared to<br />
embark on such conduct irrespective of the possibility of damages<br />
being awarded against it.<br />
Secondly, there is always no guarantee that the award of damages<br />
against the defendant will deter other potential defendants. 82<br />
Persons engaging, or intending to engage, in similar conduct may be<br />
much wealthier or deriving much more in terms of gains than the<br />
defendant. They may therefore not suffer as a result of an award of<br />
damages if caught. This is in addition to the conviction on the part of<br />
such other violators that they will never be caught or dragged to<br />
court. Indeed, the greatest deterrent is the likelihood that offenders<br />
will be apprehended, convicted and punished. 83 If the offenders do<br />
not anticipate being caught and convicted, they will not be deterred<br />
by damages awarded against defendants who have been caught and<br />
convicted. Additionally, whether or not the possibility of being<br />
dragged to court is high is also dependent on the character and status<br />
of the victims of the violation. Poor, uneducated and vulnerable<br />
victims may not have the capacity to sue the wrongdoers for damages.<br />
Persons violating the rights of such victims will therefore continue to<br />
do so with impunity as they will not anticipate any conviction or<br />
apprehension.<br />
Another weakness of awarding damages is that it offers only<br />
general deterrence because it leaves it to the government<br />
81 Shelton (n 47 above) 41.<br />
82 J Park ‘The constitutional tort action as individual remedy’ (2003) 38 Harvard<br />
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review 393 400.<br />
83 Per Chaskalson CJ in the Makwanyane case (n 30 above) para 122.