LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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CHAPTER<br />
6<br />
THE STRUCTURAL <strong>IN</strong>TERDICT:<br />
NATURE, ROLE AND<br />
APPROPRIATENESS<br />
6.1 Introduction<br />
This chapter discusses the interdict and particularly the structural<br />
interdict, especially as used in socio-economic rights litigation against<br />
government. 1 This form of relief has been reserved for detailed<br />
consideration in this chapter because it is a true reflection of the<br />
judicial flexibility required by the notion of distributive justice. This<br />
is in addition to the controversies that it has generated. The<br />
structural interdict has been used by the courts in a manner that goes<br />
against traditional perceptions of the role of the courts as envisioned<br />
under the theory of corrective justice. It has enabled judges to<br />
discard their position as mere umpires and to assume positions which<br />
make them active participants in the dispute. The courts have made<br />
not only extensive judicial decrees, but have also overseen their<br />
implementation. This has generated much controversy and objection<br />
to the structural interdict as an appropriate relief. This is because it<br />
forces courts to do things that they are ordinarily not expected to do.<br />
This chapter delineates the circumstances under which grant of a<br />
structural interdict may be considered appropriate. The approach of<br />
the South African courts towards this form of relief, especially in<br />
socio-economic rights litigation, is discussed. The approaches of the<br />
High Court, 2 on one hand, and the Constitutional Court, on the other,<br />
have differed markedly. The High Court has readily availed itself of<br />
this remedy while the Constitutional Court has emphasised the need<br />
to defer to the executive and legislative branches and not to get<br />
embroiled in what it considers to be policy issues. 3 In spite of this, the<br />
1 Some of the materials in this section have been published in the South African<br />
Journal on Human Rights. See C Mbazira ‘From ambivalence to certainty: Norms<br />
and principles for structural interdicts in socio-economic rights litigation in South<br />
Africa’ (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights (forthcoming).<br />
2<br />
In this chapter, I use the term High Court to describe all the provincial divisions of<br />
the High Court as I deem all these divisions to be part of a single level with in the<br />
judicial hierarchy.<br />
3<br />
D Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution:<br />
Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 304.<br />
165