LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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The structural interdict 197<br />
Without such information, the court may not understand the nature<br />
of the remedial problem. The court cannot rely on the parties, as is<br />
the case in the adversarial procedure, to produce all the legislative<br />
facts required. 157 In this setting, therefore, corrective justice<br />
principles ‘offer unstable foundation for structural remedies because<br />
of their limitation as principles best suited for rectification of discrete<br />
wrongs committed by one individual against another’. 158 Roach<br />
submits that corrective justice’s presumption of causation encourages<br />
an absolutist approach to remedial decision making by ignoring the<br />
socio-economic background of the violation, the involvement of other<br />
parties and interests, and the possibility that intervening forces will<br />
work against the court’s remedy. In his opinion, causation discourages<br />
open balancing of interests or addressing intervening factors that can<br />
threaten a remedial ambition. 159 Fiss follows the same line of thought<br />
and identifies a number of distinctions between the structural suit<br />
and the traditional suit. 160 These distinctions, although this is not<br />
mentioned by Fiss, are structured along the lines of the notions of<br />
corrective and distributive justice. Fiss describes the traditional suit<br />
as challenging a legal wrong as opposed to a structural suit which<br />
opposes a social condition that threatens the constitutional values.<br />
While the victim of a traditional suit is deemed to speak for him or<br />
herself, the victim of a structural suit is not an individual but a group<br />
of people. The suit could have been triggered by an individual but it<br />
remains representative of a group interest. The same may be said to<br />
apply to the defendant who may be perceived as the wrongdoer. Fiss<br />
submits that in structural suits the defendant may not even be a<br />
wrongdoer, and yet has other interested parties behind him who may<br />
not be defendants.<br />
In structural settings, the finding of an appropriate remedy may<br />
require the courts to depart from the traditional process of litigation<br />
built around individualised litigation which seeks to enforce<br />
corrective justice. The evidence on the court record at what would<br />
ordinarily be the conclusion of traditional litigation may, for instance,<br />
be inadequate for choosing an appropriate remedy. It may be<br />
necessary for the court to retain its jurisdiction in order to adjust its<br />
remedies in response to the factual discoveries that may emerge<br />
later. The court may also have to involve parties who were not part<br />
of the original litigation in its factual inquiries. 161 The traditional<br />
adversarial presentation of proof and evidence may also prove<br />
inadequate because of the need for information on facts that do not<br />
necessarily inform the disputes between the parties.<br />
157<br />
Special Project (n 66 above) 792-793.<br />
158 Roach (n 97 above) 874-875.<br />
159 Roach (n 97 above) 875.<br />
160<br />
Fiss (n 65 above) 18-32.<br />
161 Sturm (n 63 above) 1367.