LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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114 Chapter 4<br />
that may be short of full correction. This is because ‘[t]he<br />
disengagement of right and remedy in equity allows judges to provide<br />
less than rectification demands’. 56 In addition, equity allows the<br />
court to focus not only on the needs of the parties, but also to<br />
consider third-party interests implicated by the case. While equity is<br />
not explicitly part of South African law, its principles are implicitly<br />
enforced by the courts through such principles as those that require<br />
fairness.<br />
Unlike the case with corrective justice, a judge dispensing<br />
distributive justice will therefore rely on the breadth and flexibility<br />
of the equitable remedial powers without careful attention to the<br />
demands of causation and restoration. 57 Rather than be guided by<br />
strict rules of procedure, and be bound by the existing causes of<br />
action and remedies, distributive justice allows the court very wide<br />
discretion to fashion causes of action and remedies as the needs of<br />
justice demand. Distributive justice puts equity in its right place by<br />
treating it as a primary source of law. Courts, for instance, are not<br />
bound by the requirement that equitable remedies will only be<br />
available where common law remedies are proven to be inadequate.<br />
This has enabled the courts to embrace the full breadth of equity and<br />
its benefits; it may be applied in adjusting and reconciling competing<br />
claims and to enable the court go beyond the matters immediately<br />
underlying its jurisdiction and grant whatever other relief may be<br />
necessary under the circumstances. 58<br />
Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice does not emphasise<br />
liability but effects of one’s activities. Its multilateral nature compels<br />
a court to ascertain how its remedial measures, irrespective of<br />
whether or not liability has been declared, will impact on the<br />
interests of other people. The backward-looking nature of corrective<br />
justice, geared towards ascertaining liability, may not be suitable to<br />
address current legal problems. Legal problems and disputes are no<br />
longer bilateral. The world we live in now has complex and<br />
interdependent interests, a reality which the courts must<br />
acknowledge when they choose remedies. 59 All the interests<br />
56<br />
Roach (n 18 above) 860. Roach submits that the flexibility of equity provides<br />
judges with an opportunity to address the present needs of plaintiffs and<br />
defendants without concentrating on their past rights and wrongs as corrective<br />
justice requires. In his opinion, courts have generally been reluctant to use the<br />
language of needs to justify ‘enriched’ remedies, but they have used it to<br />
recognise the necessity of granting delayed and imperfect remedies. Roach<br />
submits further that the displacement of the dominance of the corrective theory<br />
will encourage courts to develop remedies tied to victims’ needs as a<br />
counterbalance to the inevitability that remedies cannot fully correct structural<br />
wrongs but will often recognise society's needs for delayed or imperfect remedies<br />
(864).<br />
57 Roach (n 18 above) 859.<br />
58<br />
J Murphy in Porter v Warner Co 328 US 395 (1946) 398.<br />
59 Roach (n 9 above) 3-19.