LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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150 Chapter 5<br />
without the need for further damages in the form of punitive<br />
constitutional damages. 104 The Court is of the view that the award of<br />
damages should not serve to punish but to compensate for the damage<br />
caused. 105 As was the case with the Canadian Supreme Court in the<br />
Vorvis case, the Constitutional Court has alluded to a historical<br />
anomaly that has allowed punitive damages, equitable to fines in<br />
criminal law, to be awarded against a person without the safeguards<br />
afforded by the criminal law: ‘It becomes even more unacceptable in<br />
a country ... in which extensive criminal procedural rights are<br />
entrenched.’ 106<br />
The Constitutional Court is also of the view that there is no real<br />
evidence that awarding punitive damages will serve as a significant<br />
deterrent against the individual or systemic repetition of<br />
infringements. 107 According to the Court, an award of punitive<br />
damages, if it is to have a deterrent effect on the government, should<br />
be substantial. The problem, in the Court’s opinion, is that this will<br />
bring a windfall to a single plaintiff and yet similarly situated victims<br />
would not be entitled to similar awards. 108 In addition, substantial<br />
awards made against the government will significantly impact on the<br />
revenue of the government and would arguably impinge on the<br />
executive’s ability to function effectively: ‘Moreover, the use of<br />
private law remedies to claim damages to vindicate public law rights<br />
may place heavy financial burdens on the state.’ 109 As seen above,<br />
though the Court has acknowledged the fact that punitive damages<br />
may lead to systemic change, it is of the view that the process might<br />
be a slow one, requiring a substantial number of such awards before<br />
change is induced. Yet, such change could be achieved using<br />
equitable relief which is far cheaper and faster. 110<br />
In addition to the above, the Constitutional Court considers<br />
damages as having a retrospective effect because they seek to<br />
remedy loss caused rather than prevent loss in the future.<br />
Furthermore, the Court has held that the award of damages to<br />
vindicate human rights violations would amount to measuring<br />
something intrinsic to human beings as if these were market-place<br />
commodities. 111 The Court has, therefore, concluded that constitutional<br />
damages will be awarded only where no relief can be<br />
104<br />
Fose case (n 99 above) para 67.<br />
105 Mokhatla case (n 37 above) para 78.<br />
106 Mokhatla case (n 37 above) para 70.<br />
107<br />
Fose case (n 99 above) para 71.<br />
108 As above.<br />
109 Rail Commuters case (n 51 above) para 80. The Court observed further that,<br />
although there could be circumstances when delictual relief may be appropriate<br />
for constitutional violations, the fact that public law remedies may be as<br />
effective and appropriate should not be overlooked (para 81).<br />
110<br />
Fose case (n 99 above) para 65(d).<br />
111 Mokhatla case (n 37 above) para 109.