LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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140 Chapter 5<br />
the law is ‘restoration of harmonious human and social relationships<br />
where they have been ruptured by an infraction of community<br />
norms’. 55 The Court held that, instead of awarding damages that<br />
merely put a hole in the defendant’s pocket, the law of defamation<br />
should strive to re-establish harmony between the parties. 56 This is<br />
because an award of excessive damages would have implications on<br />
free expression, which is the lifeblood of a democratic society. 57<br />
What this means is that vindicating the plaintiff’s injury by awarding<br />
excessive damages would be foregone for the sake of maintaining<br />
society’s right to freedom of expression. The Court in the Mokhatla<br />
case suggested that consideration should also be given to the impact<br />
the remedy has on the defendant. According to the Court, if the<br />
plaintiff’s rights can be vindicated and restoration achieved using<br />
remedies less burdensome to the defendant, this approach should be<br />
adopted. 58<br />
The Constitutional Court’s approach is in accord with the notion<br />
of cost internalisation which, as discussed in chapter four, 59 requires<br />
the court to consider the costs which any remedy it may grant will<br />
have on the defendant. Prohibitive costs increase the risk of noncompliance<br />
with the remedy. The Constitutional Court has pushed this<br />
further by considering the effect of the cost not only from the<br />
perspective of non-compliance, but also from the perspective of the<br />
benefit that society may derive. This explains why the Court has been<br />
reluctant to award damages if these would, for instance, have a<br />
negative impact on freedom of expression. As is discussed later, 60 the<br />
Court has indeed doubted the appropriateness of damages as a public<br />
law remedy and as the most appropriate method to enforce<br />
constitutional rights. 61<br />
In the context of socio-economic rights litigation, one cannot use<br />
only the situation of the litigants to judge whether the remedy of the<br />
court is an ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy as is suggested<br />
by some authors. 62 Instead, one should assess the overall impact of<br />
the remedy on the state’s policy or policies touching on the right in<br />
issue. One should ask, for instance, whether the state has overhauled<br />
55 Para 68. The judge does not elucidate on what she means by ‘community norms’<br />
but, in the context of her judgment, one could conclude that these are the values<br />
that we share as a society. This would mean that their infraction affects all<br />
members of society who share in the maintenance of these norms.<br />
56 As above.<br />
57<br />
See paras 54 & 92.<br />
58 Paras 64, 67, 112 & 113.<br />
59 Sec 4.2.<br />
60<br />
Sec 5.3.1 below.<br />
61 See generally Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a<br />
Metrorail 2005 4 BCLR 301 (CC) (Rail Commuters case).<br />
62<br />
See M Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the<br />
poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 216.