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LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP

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The structural interdict 203<br />

appreciation, if not misunderstanding, on the part of the executive of<br />

their constitutional obligations, and the role of the judiciary in<br />

reasserting these obligations through means such as the structural<br />

interdict. Rather than lead to a breakdown in the relationship<br />

between the judiciary and the executive, the structural interdict<br />

should be viewed as promoting a dynamic dialogue between these two<br />

branches. This is dialogue on the intricacies of implementing court<br />

orders and actualising constitutional rights. 182 It is clear from this<br />

case that, rather than be deferential, in those cases where there is<br />

evidence of recalcitrance from the start, use of a structural interdict<br />

as a remedy of first resort may be justified. The South African<br />

government has in the past exhibited inconsistence and incoherence<br />

towards the HIV/AIDS problem. 183 This leaves the courts with no<br />

option but to demand, on those occasions when cases are filed,<br />

concrete plans detailing the intended response to the problem. The<br />

persistence of the court in the Westville case forced the government<br />

to give in and file a plan as earlier directed. 184<br />

Analysis of the High Court approach<br />

Although the High Court has readily availed itself of the structural<br />

interdict and used it consistently, it has not devised clear principles<br />

that could determine when such remedy is appropriate. While the<br />

Court has deemed the remedy appropriate whenever there is<br />

recalcitrance on the part of government, this does not detail all the<br />

relevant principles needed to determine appropriateness and use of<br />

the structural interdict. In addition to clear principles that may be<br />

used to determine when the remedy is appropriate, there should also<br />

be principles on how the remedy should be applied. The High Court<br />

has, for instance, not determined the level of recalcitrance that<br />

would justify use of the remedy, let alone the causes of such<br />

recalcitrance. It is this lack of clear principles in respect of<br />

application of the structural interdict that has motivated me to craft<br />

a set of norms and principles applicable to this remedy. These norms<br />

and principles are detailed in section 6.6 of this chapter.<br />

One should, however, underline some of the important principles<br />

that may be deduced from the High Court’s approach. These<br />

principles, though not exhaustive, are relevant in designing more<br />

comprehensive norms and principles, as I do later. First, the High<br />

Court has made it clear that the court should retain jurisdiction where<br />

the evidence before it is inadequate for the purpose of determining<br />

182<br />

See M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic<br />

rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 414.<br />

183 See ‘Aids criticism: Manto hits back’ Mail & Guardian 11 September 2006.<br />

184<br />

See G Stolley ‘Prisons department reveals plan for AIDS drugs’ Mail & Guardian 11<br />

September 2006.

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