LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
LITIGATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA - PULP
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The structural interdict 203<br />
appreciation, if not misunderstanding, on the part of the executive of<br />
their constitutional obligations, and the role of the judiciary in<br />
reasserting these obligations through means such as the structural<br />
interdict. Rather than lead to a breakdown in the relationship<br />
between the judiciary and the executive, the structural interdict<br />
should be viewed as promoting a dynamic dialogue between these two<br />
branches. This is dialogue on the intricacies of implementing court<br />
orders and actualising constitutional rights. 182 It is clear from this<br />
case that, rather than be deferential, in those cases where there is<br />
evidence of recalcitrance from the start, use of a structural interdict<br />
as a remedy of first resort may be justified. The South African<br />
government has in the past exhibited inconsistence and incoherence<br />
towards the HIV/AIDS problem. 183 This leaves the courts with no<br />
option but to demand, on those occasions when cases are filed,<br />
concrete plans detailing the intended response to the problem. The<br />
persistence of the court in the Westville case forced the government<br />
to give in and file a plan as earlier directed. 184<br />
Analysis of the High Court approach<br />
Although the High Court has readily availed itself of the structural<br />
interdict and used it consistently, it has not devised clear principles<br />
that could determine when such remedy is appropriate. While the<br />
Court has deemed the remedy appropriate whenever there is<br />
recalcitrance on the part of government, this does not detail all the<br />
relevant principles needed to determine appropriateness and use of<br />
the structural interdict. In addition to clear principles that may be<br />
used to determine when the remedy is appropriate, there should also<br />
be principles on how the remedy should be applied. The High Court<br />
has, for instance, not determined the level of recalcitrance that<br />
would justify use of the remedy, let alone the causes of such<br />
recalcitrance. It is this lack of clear principles in respect of<br />
application of the structural interdict that has motivated me to craft<br />
a set of norms and principles applicable to this remedy. These norms<br />
and principles are detailed in section 6.6 of this chapter.<br />
One should, however, underline some of the important principles<br />
that may be deduced from the High Court’s approach. These<br />
principles, though not exhaustive, are relevant in designing more<br />
comprehensive norms and principles, as I do later. First, the High<br />
Court has made it clear that the court should retain jurisdiction where<br />
the evidence before it is inadequate for the purpose of determining<br />
182<br />
See M Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic<br />
rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383 414.<br />
183 See ‘Aids criticism: Manto hits back’ Mail & Guardian 11 September 2006.<br />
184<br />
See G Stolley ‘Prisons department reveals plan for AIDS drugs’ Mail & Guardian 11<br />
September 2006.