State of the Practice of Computer Security Incident Response Teams ...

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• Distributed dedicated CSIRTs: 100% perform incident handling, security policy development, and forensic evidence collection; 66% provide a hotline service and an advisory publication service, produce technical documents, provide training, track and trace intruders, and perform vulnerability assessments. None perform penetration testing and security configuration administration. • Distributed part-time CSIRTs: 100% provide incident handling, IDS monitoring, and security policy development; 75% monitor systems and networks, produce advisories, and publish technical documents. Other general trends: • All (100%) of those who stated that they perform penetration testing also stated that they perform vulnerability scanning services. 71 • 80% of the teams performing penetration testing identified themselves as a centralized, dedicated, or combined team. • No military, banking and finance, or non-profit CSIRT participating in the survey performs penetration testing. 72 • Of those teams performing legal investigations, 92% also perform forensic evidence collection and 85% also perform both tracking and tracing and artifact analysis. • All of those teams who stated that they provide a vulnerability assessment service also perform forensic evidence collection and security policy development. • 86% of those who provide vulnerability assessments also produce advisories. • The largest number of those doing artifact analysis work are located in a centralized or combined team (32%). • 94% of the teams performing tracking and tracing also perform artifact analysis. • 90% of the teams performing security product development services also provide training, publish advisories, and perform security policy development. The majority of those who performed security product development services were centralized teams, combined teams, or centralized coordination centers. Only 25% of the ad hoc teams perform security product development services. • Of the teams performing security configurations, all were either located in the IT department or the CSIRT was its own department. 86% of those performing this service were a combined or centralized team. 86% of those performing this service also monitored IDS. None of the ad hoc teams perform security configurations or IDS monitoring. 71 72 It should be pointed out that this was the trend we saw in the responses to the CSIRT survey. In talking with other teams who did not complete the survey, we have seen teams who performed scanning but not penetration testing. This could mean that a different part of their organization performs this type of activity. 70 CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
3.5 Staffing The majority of documents we reviewed stress the importance of identifying staff (or a team) that is responsible for handling computer security incidents. This staff may be full time and devoted to incident handling tasks, or it may be ad hoc and pulled together only when an incident occurs. 3.5.1 Staff Size A question we frequently hear is “How big should my team be?” This is not an easy question to answer, because it depends on a lot of factors. Most people involved in incident handling agree that one person is not enough, but there is no standard number concerning how many staff members are needed. This depends on the expertise of the staff, the incident workload, and the type of services offered. It also depends on what work related to incident handling and computer security is provided by other parts of the parent or host organization. Depending on the level of service provided, the size of the team may need to have a minimum number of staff. For example, for a 24x7 service like the hotline, you can begin to estimate how many staff you might need to provide this service. If you have three shifts, you will need at least four to six people to provide a basic hotline service: three to cover the shifts and a backup for each to cover sick time and vacations. Depending on the number of calls that come in, one person for each shift may not be enough. So you may need another three staff members. However, if the hotline staff also performs other tasks, such as technical monitoring, triage, or incident analysis, then even that number of staff may not be enough. There was one European CSIRT that was staffed with just one person who spent just 20% of his time handling incident reports—for a whole country. While by today’s standards this would seem an unlikely model, at that time this “team of one” provided a valuable service to other CSIRTs in the community by acting as a facilitator to distribute incident reports to the appropriate entities. In looking at the data gathered in the CSIRT Organizational Survey and through our literature review, no specific staffing trends or best practice staffing levels were seen. The survey data showed that • 31% of participating CSIRTs stated that they had 1–5 full-time staff. • 31% stated that they had 6–10 dedicated full-time CSIRT staff. • 21% stated that they had over 10 staff. • Only one stated that they had over 100 staff and that was a combined military team. • Even some ad hoc and distributed part-time teams stated that they had some staff devoted to incident handling on a full-time basis. CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001 71
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State of the Practice of Computer S
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This report was prepared for the SE
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3.1.3 Total Registered CSIRTs......
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viii CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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x CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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This document provides a view of th
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• Katherine Fithen for her contin
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xvi CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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Although CSIRTs have been in existe
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ased on a sampling of CSIRTs done v
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future growth. It can also be used
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The participating CSIRTs also repre
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10 CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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ole. This may include providing sec
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• Incident response is the action
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Model Coordinating CSIRT Descriptio
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After the worm had been successfull
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Page 100 and 101: promote “higher education in info
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3.10.1.2 Trusted Introducer for CSI
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3.10.1.5 Asia Pacific Computer Emer
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For more information see: http://ce
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3.10.3.3 Distributed Intrusion Dete
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3.10.5 Research CSIRTs and security
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3.12 Resources 3.12.1 Case Study Ex
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132 CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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standards for incident handling met
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• management support and trust fr
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We are seeking opportunities to col
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140 CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001
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3. If yes, who is that constituency
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. __ Distributed dedicated team (te
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e. __ answering hotline/help desk c
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26. What are your business hours? _
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e. __ Audit or Risk Management Depa
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Type and Title of Publication Autho
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Type and Title of Publication Autho
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Seminars include Intrusion Detectio
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TRANSITS Training Workshop http://w
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Certification Organizations Current
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Article 10 - Offences related to in
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accessing legal implications coordi
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http://thomas.loc.gov/ Bills, Publi
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18 U.S.C. § 1832 - Theft of trade
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http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
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SecurityFocus Online - Library Comp
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U.S. House of Representatives - Off
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CERT Coordination Center The CERT/C
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CIO/FBI/USSS These are the CIO Cybe
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CIO CYBERTHREAT RESPONSE & REPORTIN
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asic information that is included i
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Department of Justice Computer Crim
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FBI & USSS FIELD OFFICES TELEPHONE/
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FBI & USSS FIELD OFFICES TELEPHONE/
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CONTRIBUTORS INDUSTRY Peter Allor M
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Nebraska Information Technology Com
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COMPUTER INCIDENT REPORTING SHORT F
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3. Has your agency experienced this
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a. System(s) disconnected from the
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6. (Optional) Updates to policies a
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COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT HANDLING
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Steele The Information Assurance Te
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Network Incident Report United Stat
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Details for Probes and Scans Appare
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Details for Unauthorized Access (co
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Van Wyk and Forno In their book Inc
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Bibliography All URLs are valid as
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[Caloyannides 01] Caloyannides, Mic
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[Ferreira 96] Ferreira, Joao Nuno;
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[Kossakowski 00] Kossakowski, Klaus
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[Scalet 02] Scalet, Sarah. “Risk:
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[van Wyk 01] van Wyk, Kenneth R. &
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Index @stake, 157 abnormal network
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CIO, 84, 92 CIRC, 13 CIRT, 13 CISSP
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internal, 14, 92 internal centraliz
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incident handling, 84 reporting, 92
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security, 56, 124 support staff, 73
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incoming information, 74 priority s
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survey, xii, 5, 49, 52, 55, 67, 71,
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
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