Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
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<strong>Development</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>, <strong>Legal</strong>, & Institutional <strong>Framework</strong> <strong>for</strong> the PPP Program in Malawi<br />
Final Report<br />
program flourish under an enabling legislation that is so far down the hierarchy <strong>of</strong> legal<br />
instruments, as compared with a new law? What will potential investors think when they see<br />
that the program is based on regulations <strong>and</strong> not law? A regulation can be changed at will at<br />
any time, with little or no consultation with the law committees <strong>of</strong> the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justice <strong>and</strong><br />
Parliament. The PFMA specifically allows the Minister responsible <strong>for</strong> finance to pass<br />
regulations pursuant to the Act. By implication it also allows the Minster to repeal or change<br />
such regulations at will. Maybe something more is needed to send a signal <strong>of</strong> stability <strong>and</strong><br />
support to the market.<br />
In the countries in which PPP has flourished under regulations alone, there is a political <strong>and</strong><br />
economic culture that is naturally receptive to PPP activity. In some countries, e.g. the United<br />
States, the culture is so naturally accepting <strong>of</strong> PPP that there is no national coordinating body or<br />
legislation. But can one say the same <strong>of</strong> Malawi? Probably not, so we have provided a draft<br />
PPP Act in the Appendices to this Report <strong>for</strong> Government to consider if it decides such an Act is<br />
needed. In other countries, national PPP legislation has been enacted <strong>for</strong> one or more <strong>of</strong> the<br />
following reasons:<br />
The legal capacity <strong>of</strong> the various “spheres” <strong>of</strong> government to contract with the private<br />
sector <strong>for</strong> long-term service provision is inadequate <strong>and</strong>/or unclear;<br />
The political culture will not tolerate any vertical, hierarchical, decision-making<br />
structure so a national law is needed to underscore government’s commitment to the<br />
PPP process, <strong>and</strong> provide guidance as to how one should do PPP, but does not impose<br />
strict decision-making systems involving centralized approval; or<br />
<br />
Government considers the need to maintain strict control over the PPP process to be too<br />
important to relegate to PPP regulations, so a national umbrella law is passed to impose<br />
such control at the highest level.<br />
Existing Capacity to Contract with Private Sector<br />
In this consultancy, we have carefully examined the capacity <strong>of</strong> the various “spheres” <strong>of</strong><br />
government to contract with the private sector <strong>for</strong> the long-term provision <strong>of</strong> services. We do<br />
not see any constraints to such activity sufficient to require a national umbrella act to fill the<br />
gaps or correct the inconsistencies, which are minimal <strong>and</strong> can be rectified through internal<br />
adjustments rather than a national initiative. National gap-filling laws <strong>of</strong> this type are being<br />
used in Eastern Europe (the national concession laws) to provide a solution to major<br />
inadequacies in the contracting authority legal framework. Malawi does not have that degree <strong>of</strong><br />
inadequacy. On the contrary, the legal framework <strong>for</strong> such contracting authority is relatively<br />
well developed.<br />
So the first scenario presented above in our checklist <strong>for</strong> national legislation does not apply to<br />
Malawi. The second scenario does not apply either, as we have already shown in our<br />
examination <strong>of</strong> the PPP regulations scenario. We see no indication <strong>of</strong> substantive resistance to a<br />
central decision-making body, as long as that body is seen as facilitative <strong>and</strong> not just another<br />
layer <strong>of</strong> bureaucracy.<br />
THE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 17