Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
Development of Policy, Legal, and Insitutional Framework for - ppiaf
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<strong>Development</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>, <strong>Legal</strong>, & Institutional <strong>Framework</strong> <strong>for</strong> the PPP Program in Malawi<br />
Final Report<br />
The 4 th factor in our options analysis is Political Risk. For the purpose <strong>of</strong> this exercise, we define<br />
political risk as the reliability (or lack there<strong>of</strong>) <strong>of</strong> political support <strong>for</strong> the option being<br />
examined. In the case <strong>of</strong> Malawi, this was an important factor in scoring options that involved a<br />
longer-term role <strong>for</strong> the Privatisation Commission in the PPP program. While such options<br />
scored highly in the Use <strong>of</strong> Existing Resources factor (the pr<strong>of</strong>essional resources in the PC are<br />
considered to be quite good) the options did not fare well in the Political Risk test because: (a)<br />
donor support <strong>for</strong> the PC is expected to end at the end <strong>of</strong> 2007; <strong>and</strong> (b) although the PC has<br />
privatization revenues sufficient to continue in operation <strong>for</strong> as much as 1-3 years beyond<br />
12/31/07 <strong>and</strong> has identified some transactions it considers important to complete be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
ceasing operations, the political support <strong>for</strong> continued PC operations appears to be relatively<br />
uncertain.<br />
It is a long-st<strong>and</strong>ing policy <strong>of</strong> IP3 not to involve itself in political disputes that might<br />
compromise the independence <strong>of</strong> our analysis <strong>and</strong> recommendations. Accordingly, we did<br />
not allow the political battle over the future <strong>of</strong> the PC to influence our analysis. We waited <strong>for</strong><br />
an indication that both donor <strong>and</strong> Government had taken a decision as regards such continued<br />
support (or lack there<strong>of</strong>), <strong>and</strong> until such a decision became apparent we continued to consider a<br />
longer-term role <strong>for</strong> the PC in the PPP program. In fact, we prepared a version <strong>of</strong> this report<br />
that was distributed internally <strong>for</strong> discussion. The report envisioned a PC with a m<strong>and</strong>ate<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed to include PPP along with Privatization, passage <strong>of</strong> a new law (or amendment <strong>of</strong> an<br />
existing law) covering both PPP <strong>and</strong> Privatization, <strong>and</strong> the PPP Unit being located within the<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>ed PC on a long-term basis. We also prepared this version <strong>of</strong> the report <strong>and</strong> distributed<br />
it <strong>for</strong> discussion purposes. We waited <strong>for</strong> a decision by donor <strong>and</strong> Government, regarding the<br />
future role <strong>of</strong> the PC in the PPP program, be<strong>for</strong>e we released this final report.<br />
The decision became apparent in a Retreat <strong>of</strong> decision makers that was held at the end <strong>of</strong> March<br />
2007. Based on the session notes subsequently circulated by the Facilitator <strong>of</strong> the event, we<br />
concluded that both donor <strong>and</strong> Government had taken the decision not to involve the PC in the<br />
PPP program on a longer-term basis. There does appear, however, to be support from both<br />
donor <strong>and</strong> Government to involve the PC in the PPP program on an interim basis, <strong>and</strong> we have<br />
prepared this report accordingly.<br />
If political support <strong>for</strong> a longer-term role <strong>for</strong> the PC were to increase, <strong>and</strong> there is some<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> that happening after PwC presents its final report to Cabinet, then the total scores<br />
<strong>of</strong> longer-term PC participation options would improve. In particular, an increase <strong>of</strong> such<br />
options’ Political Risk score from the present level <strong>of</strong> 1 (indicating high political risk) were to<br />
increase to a neutral score <strong>of</strong> 5, then at least one <strong>of</strong> the longer-term PC participation in PPP<br />
options would rise to the top 5 in rank. If the score <strong>for</strong> Political Risk were to become positive,<br />
maybe 6 but certainly if 7, then at least one <strong>of</strong> the longer-term PC participation in PPP options<br />
would attain a ranking among the top 3 <strong>and</strong> would there<strong>for</strong>e require detailed analysis <strong>and</strong><br />
consideration there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
The 5 th factor used in our multi-criteria weighted options analysis, which is international best<br />
practice <strong>for</strong> policy <strong>and</strong> legal options analysis, is Value <strong>for</strong> Money. Once the option passes the<br />
Af<strong>for</strong>dability test, then the most important aspect <strong>of</strong> deciding whether or not government<br />
should make the investment is the relative amount <strong>of</strong> service provision that will be made<br />
available by the investment. The concept is similar to the private sector’s Return on Investment,<br />
THE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 30