A ripple in development? - Channel Research

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The category of tsunami affected populations has become more and more artificial over time. In the Maldives the imbalances created are very visible when four years after the tsunami, the displaced households still receive food aid and significant differences in terms of state aid divide displaced and local host communities. In Indonesia, certain donors geographically circumscribed responses to a 7 km stretch along the coastal area when much of the poorer population is located inland. High levels of aid amplify risks of increased corruption and poor governance. In the midst of corruption there is a strong possibility that interventions may be captured by private interests. At the same time there is also an opportunity for improved governance. The evidence collected by a Swedish evaluation 33 shows that, in spite of one of the longer periods of training delivered by the Do No Harm team, the agencies neglected good practice, at the time of the tsunami response, in the interest of faster response. In Sri Lanka, Transparency International claimed that the government had failed to account for as much as 44.3 percent of the international aid it had received following the tsunami and that over US$500 million in tsunami aid given to Sri Lanka had gone “missing”. 34 Among issues raised by agencies were political interference in the allotting of housing and allegations of corruption against district level officials. Transparency International recommended that the government establish a formal complaints procedure. The survey results indicate that both in Aceh, Indonesia and in Sri Lanka approximately 60% of the people surveyed claimed that no corruption existed in finding or building new housing, while a very high number remained silent on the issue. On an average about every tenth respondent confirmed corruption in the housing sector. In all instances of corruption, various irregularities were mentioned including claims in Sri Lanka about some families even receiving four houses while others still did not have access to water. The affected population in Sri Lanka was ambivalent about the role of the government since some public officials were regarded as corrupt. 35 Almost all the Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Maldivian officials and aid workers recall how they worked day and night for the first three months after the tsunami, mobilizing extra resources and putting aside all other non-essential work. Many disaster affected areas in the three countries had, prior to the tsunami, remained outside most of the development programming focus, predominantly for political reasons. The resulting lack of planning on the part of the development actors, of procedures and methods for emergency recovery designed not to return 33 Evaluation of Collaborative for Development Associates, Channel Research on Behalf of Sida, 2007 34 Transparency International Sri Lanka, (2007) Three Years after the Tsunami 35 Haug, NIBR (2007). 46
to the status quo ante, have limited speed of progress in terms of enhancing people’s participation. A yet to be published study of French government loans 36 describes the unusual complexity of identifying the priorities of national partners in the context of such a large disaster, using standard operating procedures. It also highlighted the blurred nature of areas of possible complementarity with other donors. The EC evaluation 37 of the MDF shows that a significant proportion of the projects funded show less than satisfactory performance, due to poor design. For humanitarian agencies on the other hand the “need for speed” and pressure to respond, the pressure to disburse, and pressure to deliver and phase out, accentuate the risk of plans being drafted hastily, and on the basis of the planners’ perception of the victims’ immediate needs, rather than of needs expressed by the populations themselves, with insufficient attention attached to participation and involvement. While it is difficult to strike a correct balance, time pressures generally acted against participation and information processes in the first phases of the response 38 . Emphasis on infrastructure and specifically housing due to existing needs, coupled with public pressure, state priorities, visibility considerations and humanitarian agency and donor timeframes, dictated that relatively less focus was placed on social issues, capacity issues, and in many instances local participation. 2.6 Conclusion The constraints and the positive forces that affected the State’s, Civil Society’s and the private sector’s roles in helping achieve the LRRD goals were: (1) pre-existing conditions before the tsunami, particularly conflict and the fact that the areas were not considered priority development areas, (2) the extent of devastation and limited prior institutional capacity in the areas, (3) the shifting level of legitimacy, (4) the variety of systems in place, (5) the nature of the aid provided, being more supply-driven rather than demand or needs-driven, and (6) the artificial separation of the newly created coordination mechanisms and bodies from mainstream development planning. 36 Evaluation of Agence Française de Développement Post-Disaster Programme, Channel Research 2009 37 Mid-Term Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, Particip and Channel Research for the EC, 2009. 38 TEC Synthesis Study, 2006. 47
Page 1: A ripple in development? Long term
Page 4 and 5: Authors: Emery Brusset (team leader
Page 6 and 7: 5 Risk reduction...................
Page 8 and 9: NGO OCHA Sida TEC TOR UN UNDP UNFPA
Page 10 and 11: State and civil society The interve
Page 12 and 13: tion is not complete, the achieveme
Page 14 and 15: For donor governments Strengthen lo
Page 16 and 17: 14. NGOs and UN agencies should see
Page 18 and 19: We would like to warmly thank all t
Page 20 and 21: ilitation and development (Linking
Page 22 and 23: Consequently, our study has asked:
Page 24 and 25: the style of the text in the evalua
Page 26 and 27: The team, however, enjoyed privileg
Page 28 and 29: Table 1 Summary of interviews by ca
Page 30 and 31: was the local level administration
Page 33 and 34: 2 The state and civil society 2.1 I
Page 35 and 36: On the other hand, the public’s p
Page 37 and 38: Although there is here a natural ha
Page 39 and 40: struction process, and unpredictabi
Page 41 and 42: cial structures. The context for in
Page 43 and 44: In the Maldives, the level of destr
Page 45 and 46: In Sri Lanka despite strong mobilis
Page 47: increase at the local level, the pr
Page 51 and 52: 3 Poverty, livelihoods and economic
Page 53 and 54: This evaluation has taken account o
Page 55 and 56: income by carrying out petty tradin
Page 57 and 58: The positive effects of aid assista
Page 59 and 60: Table 3e Aid disbursement flows for
Page 61 and 62: the tsunami affected areas. The Ace
Page 63 and 64: In 2005 prior to the peace agreemen
Page 65 and 66: In general, the main household inco
Page 67 and 68: omy. The Acehnese tend to have expe
Page 69 and 70: “The relatively limited economic
Page 71 and 72: was perceived to be played by NGOs,
Page 73: Yet the potential for change is cre
Page 76 and 77: Shelter and housing have been salie
Page 78 and 79: example in health or women’s live
Page 80 and 81: gramme is one of the key factors be
Page 82 and 83: not been sufficiently guided in rec
Page 84 and 85: Sri Lanka’s mainstream programme
Page 86 and 87: However, there are exceptions in bo
Page 89 and 90: 5 Risk reduction 5.1 Introduction T
Page 91 and 92: Indonesia also has new legislation
Page 93 and 94: Tsunamis present a relatively rare
Page 95 and 96: There is an issue also with the “
Page 97 and 98: More positively, the second type of
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6 Capacity development 6.1 Introduc
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and Italy. The Programme’s object
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sulted communities in the east to c
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things to many actors over time res
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The use of information plays a cons
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7 Conclusions The conclusions here
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The following figure illustrates th
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7.3 The need to give greater effect
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Attention has not yet focused on ar
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7.8 Overall conclusion The risk of
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8 Recommendations The recommendatio
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8.2 For donor governments Strengthe
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43. Conflict sensitivity analysis s
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Appendix 1 Terms of reference 1 Int
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1.2 The LRRD concept 4 LRRD is a mu
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The efforts of the international ai
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2.2.1 Thematic questions A. The ret
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c) How have the micro-politics of l
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Particular issues to be reviewed in
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In order to obtain relevant materia
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Within two weeks prior to commencin
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Appendix 2 Details of methodology A
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District Sub District Samples Total
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Appendix 3 List of persons and grou
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Surname, Forenames Dilreshi Dirhams
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Surname, Forenames Krassnitzer, Joh
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Surname, Forenames Organisation and
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Surname, Forenames Tveitnes, Ranvei
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Date Attendees No. of ♂ No. of
Page 164:
This report is a follow-up evaluati
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