wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

VALUES AND CONFLICTS: WHERE DIFFERENT VALUES MEET107“the greatest good of the greatest number” 62would force early generations to excessivesaving to allow later generations to live aluxurious life. Intergenerational justicefavours a more egalitarian development 63which requires the discounting of futurevalues 64 . This can be done by way of● discounting of well-being (utilitydiscounting), in which future well-being isgiven less weight than present well-being,or● financial discounting, in which not thewell-being itself, but the monetary costsand benefits which determine future wellbeing,are discounted 65 .The discounting of well-being solely becauseit lies in the future (“myopic behaviour”) is awidespread phenomenon: people generallyprefer enjoying something now to enjoyingit later; we prefer to go to the dentist tomorrowinstead of today. Similarly, problems for futuregenerations are considered as less importantthan problems right now. Our “defectivetelescopic faculty” 66 makes us believe thateven very important things becomeunimportant once the distance to them in timeis long enough. Important things, however,do not become unimportant in time: theyremain important for those affected by them.No smoker will consider lung cancer in 20years equally important to a cold tomorrow.Myopic behaviour is contrary to the conceptof sustainable use, because it treats theinterests of future generations as being ofless value than similar interests of the presentgenerations. If a civilised society ischaracterised by its respect for the weak, itshould respect the interests of futuregenerations even more than those of thepresent, because - unlike contemporaries -future generations are powerless against theharmful actions of the present 67 .The importance attached to some thingsdoes, however, change with time. A boy ofeight years, for whom a ditch is too difficultto cross, can be confident that after ten yearshe will have grown and will be able to jumpacross it easily. Similarly, economic,technological, scientific, and moral growthcan be acceptable justifications fordiscounting future costs and pains. If futuregenerations are better-off than the presentgeneration, it will be easier for them to copewith the problems being caused by the latter.This approach is not universally applicable:people in the19th century would have beencorrect in discounting the future paininvolved in a visit to the dentist, because thepain involved in dentistry has been reducedsubstantially since. But they would havebeen much less justified in discounting thepain caused by cancer, as this disease haslost none of its malignity. Thus, it is essentialfor any sensible resource planning to developsound expectations as to what will becomeeasier tasks in the future and what will not.Future generations cannot blame the presentgeneration if it errs in such decisions afterdue reflection but they can attach blame ifthe present generation does not reflect to thebest of its ability 68 .Normal and vital functions: Taking thefuture into account therefore requires that we:● identify vital functions (= essential andnon-substitutable) which, to the best ofpresent knowledge, will remain equallyimportant and regarding which it cannotbe prudently assumed that progress willsolve the problems associated with theirdecrease or disappearance 69 . Their effectin the future must therefore receive thesame attention from us as their presenteffect. For these issues no form ofdiscounting is applicable.● apply some routine valuation procedure forall other normal functions (non-essentialor substitutable), allowing for flexibility,adaptation, substitution, progress, andgrowth. This valuation can imply anelement of discounting, based on theexpectation (which must be well-founded)that the provision of these concreteservices or resources will be of a lower