wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

VALUES AND CONFLICTS: WHERE DIFFERENT VALUES MEET115more important than “you”, finding a personhere more important than a person somewhereelse, finding two human beings more importantthan one human being).21A priority is a measure of importance in time(e.g. short-term versus long-term).22Thoreau 1864 (in: Homan 1991).23Being reliant on both sender and receiver.24A consensus can, for example, easily be reachedon questions like “peatland forestry leads toincreased peat accumulation” (cf. Crill et al. 2000,Joosten 2000) or “peatland biodiversity leads topeatland stability” when– all parties involved really want to know theright answer,– agreement exists on the content of the terms(“peat”, “biodiversity”, “stability”, etc.) andthe period of time and location and area underconsideration, and– all available information on the subject isexchanged.25Rawls 1971.26I.e. things that have a “price” and can beexchanged for a set of alternatives; Cf. Kant1785: “In the realm of aims, everything haseither a price or a dignity. For what has a price,something can be put as an equivalent at its place;what on the contrary is above all price, andtherefore allows no equivalent, has a dignity.”The equivalency may be based on theaccomplishment of the same aims (e.g. peat orwood for energy generation) or on indifferencein utility (e.g. a bottle of whisky versus an orchidin a vase). Preferences apply to both needs andwants The Universal Declaration of HumanRights recognises the right to pursue wants solong as this does not violate the rights of others(see Table 4/3). This means that the wants ofone party can never prevail over the needs andbasic liberties of others. See §4.6.27Apart from unsolvable practical problems, seebelow.28For an in-depth discussion on possibilities,methods and restrictions of monetarisation, seeGrönemann & Hampicke 1997, on which muchof the following is based.29Somebody can be equally happy with theexistence of a close relative and without a milliondollars as without the existence of that relativeand with a million dollars. For that person, theexistence of the relative only has an instrumentalvalue and a price, however no intrinsic value, i.e.no “dignity”. It is impossible to monetariseintrinsic value.30Attfield & Dell 1996.31Although the fulfilment of an individual’s wantsis not necessarily beneficial for him or her, theright to liberty (see §4.6) requires that we respectthese choices as long as no rights of others areviolated. The choices may only be influenced byinformation and education: these may transformpreferences.32including the aspects of reversibility, cf. Joosten1997.33See §3.1.34See the needs and wants discussion, and theGeneral Conception of the Principles of Justiceof Rawls (1971) in §4.6.35In order to provide genuine equality ofopportunity, society must give more attentionto those with fewer native assets and to thoseborn into less favourable social positions (Rawls1971). The policy of positively weighing thegains and losses of those at a low level of wellbeingis consistent with most notions of socialjustice, and may also be justified in that actingthus makes a greater beneficial difference, andsatisfies desires which are more crucial and morepervasive. The weights to be attached to theutility of different parties at different levels ofwell-being must be settled by politicians; butdecision-making can only claim to be rationalwhere it is based on the foreseeable consequencesfor all affected parties, and where the sameweights are used consistently throughout (Attfield& Dell 1996).36Intrinsic value is an absolute concept: somethingeither has (+) or lacks (0) it. Instrumental valuesare generally comparative, i.e. more or less suited(+1, +2, +3, ...) for a specific purpose.37Possible obligations to future generations are dealtwith in §4.7.38Cf.Hampicke 2000. This problem results fromthe dilemmas of being a rational social being. Allanimals distinguish between “group members” and“non-group members” and must treat thesedifferently (otherwise all predators would eat theiroffspring). Social beings have an extendedsympathy that includes other beings than thedirect offspring, i.e. that exceeds direct egoism.Rational beings are aware of the existence of thisboundary between “in” and “outside” the circle,and - driven by the (social) tendency towardsextended sympathy - question the rationale ofthe boundary (Midgley 1983). This has in historyled to extending moral circles, as, for example, isapparent in the development of U.S.A. legislationthat subsequently extended rights to Americancolonists (Declaration of Independence 1776),slaves (Emancipation Proclaration 1863), women(Nineteenth Amendment 1920), nativeAmericans (Indian Citizenship Act 1924),Labourers (Fair Labor Standards Act 1938), andblacks (Civil Rights Act 1957), cf. Nash 1989.39“We have no choice but to be especially interestedin ourselves and those close to us.” (Midgley1996).40UN General Assembly 1948, modified after Taylor1986.41I.e. that do not violate the rights of others.42In so far as it does not compromise other people’srights.43Cf. McGee W. J.: “Conservation is the use ofnatural resources for the greatest good of thegreatest number for the longest time.” (Herfindahl1961).44Cf. Crocker 1990, “Live simply that others maysimply live”, Salleh 1990.45Hurka 1993.46Rawls (1971) argues that the correct principles