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wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

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VALUES AND FUCTIONS OF MIRES AND PEATLANDS45CHAPTER 3.VALUES AND FUNCTIONS OF MIRES AND PEATLANDSThis chapter sets out the types <strong>of</strong> values that human beings <strong>use</strong> in making choices betweenalternative benefits. It sets out the different benefits which are derived from <strong>mires</strong> <strong>and</strong> peatl<strong>and</strong>s.A substantial number <strong>of</strong> experts have contributed material for this chapter.3.1. WHAT ARE VALUES? 1Solving conflicts between different <strong>use</strong>s <strong>of</strong><strong>mires</strong> <strong>and</strong> peatl<strong>and</strong>s (for example, betweeneconomic utilisation <strong>and</strong> environmentalconservation) in a rational way presupposesan underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> the various values 2 atstake. There are at least three fundamentallydifferent approaches to what values are 3 :■■■In the idealistic approach, based on ancientGreek philosophy, values are regarded asideal <strong>and</strong> objective, independent <strong>of</strong> the realworld. It is assumed that these values areknown through a special “intuitus”.Followers <strong>of</strong> this approach are currentlyrare 4 .In the naturalistic approach, values areregarded as objective properties <strong>of</strong> anentity 5 , independent <strong>of</strong> the person makingthe valuation. Things in the real world areconsidered to have value, just as they havemass or velocity. Several world religions<strong>and</strong> contemporary environmentalphilosophers defend this approach 6 .In the preference approach, values areregarded as properties assigned by avaluer, resulting from the preferences <strong>of</strong> theperson making the valuation. “Absolute”values do not exist. Each person is free tovalue entities as he or she feels about them.Consequent on the many different resultingpreferences, a great variety <strong>of</strong> valuest<strong>and</strong>ardsexist. None <strong>of</strong> these valuest<strong>and</strong>ardscan be considered “better” or“worse” than the others except when otherpremises make them so. Most experts invalue theory (axiology) currently supportthis preference approach.Values are generally divided into twocategories:● Instrumental values are clear means to anend (“instruments”). Instrumental value isequal to function 7 : the beneficial effect <strong>of</strong>an entity on another entity. Instrumentalvalues can be studied systematically byscience <strong>and</strong> are therefore more objectivethan intrinsic values.● Entities that are to be respected as such,i.e. independent from everything else, aresaid to have intrinsic moral value (or“moral st<strong>and</strong>ing”).The existence <strong>of</strong> intrinsic moral values islogically included in the idea <strong>of</strong> a mean-endrelationship, when a chain <strong>of</strong> means(instrumental values) is considered to cometo an end at something which has value assuch (intrinsic value) 8 . Consequently eventhe preference approach has ultimately toidentify objects with “intrinsic value”, i.e. thatdeserve moral respect for their own sake,independent <strong>of</strong> whether we prefer it or not. 9It is therefore a central question to identifywhich entities have such intrinsic moral value,to which entities we have moral obligations,<strong>and</strong> for what reasons.

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