wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

VALUES AND FUCTIONS OF MIRES AND PEATLANDS93Intrinsic valuesValue types “Conservation” motives “Economic” motivesD N I ENoocentrism 316 Protection of all + use and commercial +rational beingsexploitation of thisand theirpositionenvironment 317Pathocentrism Protection of all + use and commercial +sentient beings andexploitation of thistheir environmentpositionBiocentrism Protection of all + use and commercial +living beings andexploitation oftheir environmentthis positionEcocentrism Protection of all + + use and commercial +/ holism beings and systems exploitation of thisand their environmentpositionDoes not use/exploit the values as such, but only the people who value these values.D = diversity, patterns; N = naturalness, wildness, processes; I = Income, monetary profit; E =employment, social benefits.Table 3/22: Relevance of focal points of “conservation” and “economic” motives of peatlandland use with respect to various value types.1This chapter has benefited greatly frominformation provided by, and discussions with,Konrad Ott, Martin Gorke, and Anne-JelleSchilstra.2Different people attribute worth to differentqualities. Some may value a mire for its beauty,others for its scientific value, yet others for thepeat which can be extracted from it. Others againconsider the mire to be of value just because itexists. This last view may seem extreme topragmatic minds but they must understand thatsuch views do exist.3Prior 1998.4But cf. Taoism and Pirsig 1974.5“Entity” is used in this document as meaninganything which exists whether physically orconceptually (cf. Latin “ens”).6Cf. also Table 3/1.7In this document the term function is used toexpress an action of an entity that positivelyaffects the object of that action (i.e. is useful).Function is the complement of use, i.e. the sameaction (relation, factor) can be seen as a function(from the perspective of the provider) or as a use(from the perspective of the beneficiary).8Outside nihilism, it is illogical to imagine a unidirectionalchain of means without any final ends.Mean-end relationships, however, can also beregarded as a network in which the interconnectedstrands of the web form infinite circular lineswithout final ends. In such a view a cleardistinction between means and ends disappears (seealso §4.10).9Cf. the difference between axiological objectivismand meta-ethical objectivism in Birnbacher 1996.10From the Greek ανθρωποσ, oi ανθρωποι, man,mankind.11UN General Assembly 1948.12Cf. Declaration of the UN Conference on theHuman Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972:“5. ..of all things in the world, people are themost precious.”13World Commission on Environment andDevelopment 1987.14Although some of them are “brought back in”again by referring to their potential rationality.15Cavalieri & Singer 1993, Parr 2001.16Reis & Marino 2001, Tschudin et al. 2001.17“Sympathy for life”.18Cf. The World Charter for Nature (UN GeneralAssembly Resolution 37/7 and Annex, 28 October1982): “Every form of life is unique, warrantingrespect regardless of its worth to man, and, toaccord other organisms such recognition, manmust be guided by a moral code of action.”, and“General principles. 1. Nature shall be respectedand its essential processes shall not be impaired.”.19This does not necessarily mean that all beingsare considered to have equal value. See also §4.10and §5.8.20Some essentially instrumental positions can comeclose to attributing intrinsic moral value to nonhumanbeings by:● assigning them the right not to be unnecessarily