wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

VALUES AND CONFLICTS: WHERE DIFFERENT VALUES MEET109effectively used in commerce). Traditions,however, change with time. In many countriesit has become normal to pay for the care ofthe elderly, a practice unthinkable in formertimes. Other experiences and phenomenahave no price, because they are neitherproduced nor have a clearly definedownership. Most of the regulation and nonmaterial-life-supportfunctions (see Tables3/3 and 3/4) are such “collective goods”. Thetechniques for monetarising these functionsare generally underdeveloped 77 . Someecosystem functions can not be valued,because their precise contribution is notknown and indeed unknowable until theycease to function 78 . Other functions cannotbe monetarised because there is nothingequivalent to be put at their place: intrinsicvalues are by definition without price 79 .Consequently, any weighting can only bepartial and whole ranges of values, benefitsor disadvantages escape monetaryevaluation (i.e. they are regarded as “freegoods”) 80 .Freely functioning markets are based onnarrow self-interest. The upstream polluterhas no incentive to account for the cost heimposes on a downstream user of the river.The non-consideration of such“externalities” – the third party costs – maylead to decisions that are “wise” for theindividual now, but “unwise” for societyas a whole 81 (and that may eventually alsobe harmful to the individual) 82 . This is amarket failure.Similarly government interventions in themarket, for example to serve some socialpurpose, may be accompanied by an underappreciationof environmental benefits.Examples include financial incentives fordeforestation or peatland drainage, theunderpricing of water resources, and manyagricultural subventions 83 . This is anintervention failure.Some regulation and information functionsexceed national boundaries, e.g. themaintenance of global biodiversity or thepeatland carbon store 84 . But if the country inquestion receives no financial or otherresources to pay for these global externalbenefits, it will have no incentive to look afterthese resources 85 . This is a globalappropriation failure 86 .Correction of these failures is necessary tobetter reflect the value of ecosystem servicesand natural capital in national accounting.Various methods have been and are beingdeveloped for that purpose 87 , includingmethods applicable to wetlands 88 . Suchmethods attribute monetary value either bydirectly asking people to state their strengthof preference for a proposed change (e.g.“willingness-to pay” for enjoyment of a naturereserve) or by indirect comparison withactual, observed market-based information(e.g. by assessing the costs of travel to anature reserve, or the costs of substitutingthe natural water purification function bysewage treatment plants). In this way,Costanza et al. (1997) estimated the servicesthat nature provides at between $16 and $54trillion per year 89 . Such attributed monetaryvalues can then be fed into a comprehensivecost-benefit analysis (CBA) 90 . Table 4/4presents some figures related to wetlands andpeatlands that were assessed in this way.Even though economic value can only relateto preferences, there are several reasons whya complete monetarisation and cost-benefitanalysis may be difficult or impossible 126 :■ Every determination of monetary value ismarginal, i.e. only refers to small parts of alarger available total 127 .■ The order of peoples’ preferences is notconstant but changes with environmentalconditions 128 , income levels and budgetavailability 129 , knowledge andtechnologies, availability of substitutesand alternatives, personal circumstances 130and public policies 131 . It is subject tohysteresis-effects 132 , and dependent on a